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different reasons, have become Beijing’s junior partners at
best, if not client states. This was true, even before Russia’s
inexcusable invasion of Ukraine, but is even more true today,
as Chinese support, long essential to Pyongyang’s survival,
now appears crucial to keeping Putin’s government propped
up as well.
Of the three sets of bilateral relationships that make up this
three-way grouping, the biggest geopolitical change has been
in Russia-North Korea relations. For years, Putin looked
down on Kim Jong-Un with disrespect and disdain. Now he
approaches the North Korean dictator with hat in hand, given
his desperate need for ammunition and missiles to support his
ill-gotten gains in Ukraine. This, for now, gives Kim Jong-Un
the upper hand and raises concern, not just in the West but in
China as well, regarding the quid pro quos Kim will demand
in return.
This is where the “three versus three” framework becomes
shaky. In addition to, and complicating, the two blocks is
each individual member’s relationship with each of the others.
In truth, this amounts to 15 separate and distinct bilateral
relationships, each with its own set of strengths and (mostly)
weaknesses. As a result, in addressing the trilateral challenge,
one must look at it in bilateral as well as multilateral terms.
One could argue that the China-Russia, China-North Korea,
and North Korea-Russia relationships are all marriages of
convenience among parties with long histories of distrust
toward one another (not to mention a few still unresolved
territorial issues). They are currently being brought together
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