Page 232 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

from administration to administration, U.S. national interests
seldom shift dramatically. President Trump’s negotiating style
certainly differed from most others who have held the job, but
the centrality of the U.S. alliance network as the “foundation”
of U.S. policy has changed little in the past 75 or more years.

Candidate Trump is not the first presidential aspirant to
threaten to remove U.S. forces from Asia. That “honor” goes
to Jimmy Carter, who discovered as president that this was
easier said than done. Recent Congressional legislation
aimed at insuring that no future U.S. president (read: Trump)
can unilaterally remove U.S. forces from Europe or Asia
without Congressional approval further restricts presidential
authority in this regard, demonstrating that the U.S. system
of checks and balances remains alive and well. It also signals
a realization that many in Congress share Korea’s and Japan’s
fears.

In the meantime, regardless of the reason or motivation, steps
are already underway in all three capitals to institutionalize the
agreements and practices outlined at the Trilateral Leaders’
Summit at Camp David (2023)—the “virtual alliance” gets
stronger by the day.

Standing Firm

Standing firm against the security challenges posed by North
Korea requires more than just the necessary strengthening
of trilateral security cooperation. Such measures need to
be complemented by efforts by all three states, individually

232 Section III : South Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: How to Deter Pyongyang and Dissuade Beijing