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and collectively, to dissuade China from underwriting and
empowering Pyongyang and repatriating its escapees. It also
requires finding and exploiting the limits inherent in the
China-Russia “without limits” partnership and Beijing’s “close
as lips to teeth” quasi-alliance relationship with North Korea.
Each of the three partners has unexplored or underutilized
leverage in its own dealing with Beijing that needs to be
examined and then deployed. Since the THAAD episode,
many South Korean multinationals have been looking
elsewhere to invest their dollars and expertise; Southeast and
South Asia is calling! Taiwan provides an example. This past
year, Taiwan had more direct foreign investment in Southeast
Asia than in China, a major shift driven by both economic and
political considerations. Japanese and Korean businesses need
to follow suit, and some already are.
China professes to also want better relations with the United
States and rejects the “New Cold War” formulation that
many are using to describe the emerging relationship (despite
continuing to do and say many things that would justify that
characterization). First and foremost, Washington should
reinvigorate the demand for reciprocity and a level playing
field. Why should TikTok be allowed to operate in the United
States when Facebook and Google searches are banned
in China? While the U.S. today is far from the paragon of
“free and open” trade that it once professed to be, there is no
comparison between the openness and access to the American
market compared to that of China’s. This too must change.
China should also be challenged to live up to its own stated
Chapter Fourteen : Standing Firm Against North Korea-China Challenges 233