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What do those seemingly contradictory messages suggest?
            My answer is that North Korea is becoming strategically
            defensive and tactically offensive. It seems that Kim Jong-Un
            is attempting to enhance the chance of his regime’s survival
            by consolidating the division of the Korean Peninsula.
            His country is lagging behind South Korea in all aspects
            of competition except for nuclear and long-range missile
            capabilities. In fact, North Korea has long been strategically
            defensive and tactically offensive. The only difference before
            and after Kim’s January speech is that North Korea’s anti-
            unification or division-consolidation policy has now become
            official.


            North Korea used to discuss the “dire threat” posed by the
            United States while belittling South Korea. Today, the
            country’s top leader officially acknowledged that the Republic
            of Korea, the “most hostile state” in the nearest neighborhood,
            has created in the nearest neighborhood a “special
            environment.” Kim regards South Korea as “despicable,
            arrogant, and rude.” If a war broke out, his country would
            defend its sovereignty, the security of its people, and its “right
            to existence.” North Korea’s new policy is based on “recognizing
            the two states coexisting on the Korean Peninsula.”

            South Korea has a population twice as large as that of North
            Korea. South Korea’s gross domestic product is 60 times as
            large as North Korea’s. South Korea spends about 10 times
            as much as North Korea on defense. Pyongyang is concerned
            about the negative political consequences of the infiltration
            of South Korean culture––K-pop and K-dramas––into the
            minds of North Korean people. North Korea enacted the



            Chapter Four : Growing Strategic Linkages and North Korea’s Anti-Unification Policy  73
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