Page 78 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation
P. 78
Introduction
China has two sets of “Three No’s” that drive its policy toward
North and South Korea. First is that it wants no war, no instability
or regime collapse that causes instability, and no nuclear weapons
1
on the Korean peninsula. It is a pretty good baseball team because
it is batting over .600 as it has sustained two out of three of its
objectives. The second set are the “Three No’s” that Xi demanded
from the former South Korean President in 2017 which include:
no more THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)
missile defense deployment, no integrated missile defense with
the U.S. and Japan, and no trilateral South Korea-Japan-U.S.
2
Alliance. The question is: can China successfully achieve these
policy goals or will it suffer the same fate as Mao and Stalin due
to the long history of the Kim family regime manipulating its
major “allies” against each other as it tries to create dilemmas for
3
the South Korea-U.S. Alliance? It is likely that North Korea will
always be an independent and malign actor.
To assess relations between China and both North and South
Korea, the nature, objectives, and strategy should be considered
because these guide policy implementation.
1 Max Fisher, “Why China still supports North Korea, in six little words,” The Washington Post, February 12,
2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/12/why-china-still-supports-North-
korea-in-six-little-words/
2 Korea Herald Editorial Board, “[Editorial] No to Three No’s,” The Korea Herald, August 12.2022, https://www.
koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220811000838
3 James I. Matray, “The Korean War 101: Causes, Course, and Conclusion of the Conflict,” Association for Asian
Studies, Volume 17:3 (Winter 2012): US, Asia, and the World: 1914–2012, https://www.asianstudies.org/
publications/eaa/archives/the-korean-war-101-causes-course-and-conclusion-of-the-conflict/
Chapter Five : “Three No’s” Times Two: China’s North and South Korea Policy 77