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     The UK Defence Industry in the 21  Century
                                                                        st
                                            The Five Forces of Americanisation
               The Five Forces of Americanisation
               5.  Financial Markets
               Synopsis
               It will surprise few people that the world’s three largest spenders on defence are the USA, China and
               Russia. Together, they invest over 53% of the world’s total defence expenditure. UK spending accounts
               for 3.1%. It would logically follow, therefore, that nine of the world’s top ten defence companies are
               either American, Chinese or Russian.
               Given its host government’s “competition by default” domestic procurement policy for over 30 years
               and regarding the reshaping of its DIB as “very much industry’s business”, it is noteworthy that one of
               the world’s top ten defence companies is British. Whilst this is largely due to the fact that most of its
               business is in the USA, it reflects the uniquely interdependent nature of US and UK defence industrial
               relations.
               Successive  UK  governments’  policies  have  created  a  multinational  UK  DIB.  The  nationalities  of  its
               owners naturally tended to reflect the international frameworks established at the end of World War
               II. Hence, whilst the USA is the dominant participant in UK Defence, French, Italian, Israeli, German and
               Swedish companies have also acquired British firms. US management consultants, investment bankers,
               private investors and corporate leaders have also played major roles in formulating and implementing
               UK Defence Reform.
               With  the  UK  state  stepping  back  as  investors  or  business  leaders,  it  follows  that  capital  market
               principles and practices have progressively exerted more influence on the shape and structure of the
               DIB than UK government policy. Having brought its largest British-based company, BAE Systems, to the
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               brink of financial collapse in 2003 , between 2019 and 2021, the effects of reform culminated in a
               private US fund manager exploiting inefficiencies in UK financial markets and a period of acute UK
               government instability to acquire and break up two of the UK’s most influential defence groups trading
               on the London Stock Exchange, Cobham plc and Ultra Electronics plc. Since, at the same time, Russian
               troops were massing on the Ukrainian border preparing for the most serious war in Europe for several
               decades, the transactions exemplified the UK’s relaxed attitude to its national defence and security
               infrastructure: summarised by a government spokesman as a  “a commercial matter for the companies
               involved”.
               These two transactions are highly significant, not only from a financial markets perspective but also in
               reflecting  a  significant  absence  in  government  of  both  financial  acumen  and  of  a  reasonable
               understanding  of  how  financial  markets  affect the  delivery  of  numerous  public  services.  Including
               defence. Cobham and Ultra are therefore reviewed at length in the following pages. They reflect a shift
               away  from  the  pragmatic  behaviour  of  global  stock  markets  and  the  notion  of  share  ownership:
               stability,  transparency,  long  term  visibility  of  earnings,  prudent  financial  policy,  all  supported  by
               resilient capital structure. Instead, they highlight the  emergence of a new business culture. A culture
               attuned to shorter timescales and a transactional attitude to ownership energised by the aggressive
               use of debt to realise substantial financial rewards. The appointment in March, 2025 as US Deputy
               Secretary of  Defense of one of the USA’s most successful financier in this category may well be a
               notable development in how the defence industry will be structured and finance in future.
               The sales of Cobham and Ultra also continued a trend that we identified in 2005: the transfer to foreign
               ownership of an increasing number of UK-based defence companies, cutting the number of UK-listed
               defence manufacturing companies by 50% in the process. The remaining indigenous British businesses
               now prioritise the larger and more lucrative US market, even though they remain listed in the UK.
               Defence Reform has affected the wider UK defence industrial community too, depleting the national
               financial, professional, intellectual and commercial infrastructure that had previously played its part
               in sustaining its competitiveness at home and abroad. If British companies believe that a UK listing
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               07/07/2025                                                                                                                                   Richard Hooke 2025
     	
