Page 66 - Five Forces of Americanisation Richard Hooke 04072025 final post SDR1
P. 66

The UK Defence Industry in the 21  Century
                                                                        st
                                            The Five Forces of Americanisation

               analysis over the next few pages in this paper. Its characteristics illustrated the extent of the damage
               inflicted on the UK’s Defence & Security capabilities by UK Defence Reform, exposing the myth of
               business and commercial rationality in the process. This myth has also been exposed by the more
               aggressive use of debt available to private fund managers, who are unconcerned by the rigour of credit
               ratings agencies like Moody’s or S&P. Cobham’s decline, sale and break up will undoubtedly become
               a business school case study but it does serve to demonstrate that, if not corrected early, defects in
               management and accounting will lead to mistakes that can rapidly escalate into potential failure. It
               also  demonstrates,  however,  that,  with  the  appropriate  analysis,  failure  can  be  predicted.  (See
               Appendix 1). A vigilant, stable board of directors should therefore be able to take appropriate action
               and head off the dubious attraction of a bid from private equity in an obvious act of arbitrage. If, as in
               Cobham’s case, its board is unable to instigate corrective executive action then a major customer, like
               the MoD, should reasonably be expected to explore the scope for constructive intervention. The MoD
               was unable to do so in this case. This would tend to characterise one of the disadvantages arising from
               the “adversarial relationship” between industry and the MoD created by Defence Reform.
                     While the Financial Times suggested that shareholders should have secured a better price arising
                     from a more sensible and substantially higher “sum of the parts” valuation, The Guardian’s Nils
                     Pratley was more direct: “the takeover of Cobham is rotten on purely commercial grounds. A
                     timid board rolled over too easily and weak shareholders voted by a 93% majority for the sugar
                     rush of a 34% takeover premium … A well-run Cobham … could surely have done better over the
                     long term by keeping its independence. Short-termism won and may continue to do so – Advent
                     will probably make a bumper profit by selling Cobham in pieces within five years”
                                    th
                     (The Guardian, 19  September, 2019)
               __________________________________________________________________________________
                      The Sale of Cobham plc to Advent International

                      The Business Secretary decided that Cobham’s sale would not be a threat to national
                      security. However, much of the evidence presented to the Competition & Markets
                      Authority (“CMA”), including from the MoD, found that the capabilities to be sold
                      were of significant value to UK defence, both now and in the future, where their
                      further development would accord with the UK’s military priorities – not those of a
                      new owner’s host country. Evidence submitted also contended that the proposed
                      buyer  was  unsuitable  and  would  break  up  the  company,  damaging  UK  security
                      interests  (which  turned  out  to  be  the  case).  What  was  clear,  however,  is  that  its
                      disposal  would  deplete  the  UK’s  DIB  and  signal  a  relaxed  attitude  to  sustaining
                      valuable  defence  capabilities.  Capabilities  that  included  those  attributes  (in-flight
                      refuelling  equipment,  for  example)  relevant  to  the  deployment  of  expeditionary
                      forces.  Cobham’s  disposal  also  reinforced the  notion,  gleaned  from  the  “on-shore
                      only” priorities for the UK DIB outlined in the 2019 DSIS, that overseas deployments
                      might be considered less of a priority for UK defence in future. It also passed up an
                      opportunity for the UK to retain a critical presence in the notoriously expensive and
                      relentlessly  exclusive  US  Air  Force  KC-46  air  tanker  programme.  In  the  new,
                      “transactional” world being defined by President Trump, this could appear naïve. It
                      was certainly commercially and, very probably, politically wasteful.

                      Given the US President’s decision in March, 2025, to “pause” the supply of equipment
                      to Ukraine, a relaxed attitude to defence technology was not a stance likely to attract
                      American respect. In stark contrast, the astonishing story of the USAF KC-46 (outlined

                      in  this  paper  as  Case  Study  2) ,  underscores  the  USA’s  dogged  commitment  to
                      developing a capability of enormous significance to the US Armed Forces: a critical
                      force-multiplier, it increases the endurance capacity of the world’s most advanced
                      combat aircraft: a significant embodiment of power projection.


               66
               07/07/2025                                                                                                                                   Richard Hooke 2025
   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71