Page 35 - World Airnews Magazine February 2020 Edition

HUMAN
AFRICA
FACTORS

LEGAL AND REGULATORY REWARDING NEGATIVES MAY

CHALLENGES ADDRESSED NOT BE A GOOD IDEA

World Airnews correspondent in Nairobi Githae Mwaniki
reports on the 7th African Aviation Law Conference

ey aviation professionals and lawyers converged on Nai-
Krobi at the 7th African Aviati on Law Conference organised

by Outlook Solutions and the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority to

review the status of the African aviation industry’s legal and regu-
latory sectors.

After the opening, Kenyan national civil aviation administrative

review tribunal chairman Peter Muholi outlined the status of avia-
tion safety in Africa and the role of the tribunal.

He said the tribunal had handled several disputes between pas-
sengers/companies and airlines or travel agents and in most cases
the disputes were handled between 30 - 60 days because there are
no costs in lodging a case. By Matita Tshabalala

He urged all African states to set up a permanent arbitration

tribunal to fast track the handling of aviation disputes. Image by WikiImages from Pixabay

IATA manager legal services Fodam Otieno called on African

states and authorities to lobby for more attention to be given to components of safety culture is reporting

aviation matters. wherein people are encouraged to report for under reporting, and to colleagues
His call came in the wake of the challenges of the grounding of the any organisations use some incidents and/or near misses. Literature being blamed for the team’s lost reward.

Boeing 737 Max and the Joint Authoritative Review Board set up to Mcategory of rewards or incen- has shown that reporting becomes difficult Reporting culture will be severely compro-

review the certification of the Max without an African state included. tives with the hope of influencing people or tends to be underreported in instances mised and in the absence of a reporting

This, he said, yet the second accident of the Max was in Africa – where people are rewarded for not having culture, focusing on error results is likely

Ethiopia, and it should have been prudent to include Ethiopia on to behave in a particular manner. This, we incidents (Roughton and Crutchfield, 2014; to drive people to ‘manage the measure’.

this board. see, mostly in a sales environment where Woods et al., 2010) People do not deliber- For example, by concealing or reclassify-
ing events so results improve, on paper,

The various aircraft financing models used to acquire aircraft employees who sell a certain number ately commit errors and by rewarding indi- even though actual performance remains
including an outright purchase and lease options were outlined by of goods or reach a certain set target viduals for having few or no errors, there is unchanged. Managing safety becomes a

Hanee Khan, a senior associate at IKM advocates. are incentivised and rewarded for their an assumption that people commit errors numbers game.

He said a finance lease is where payments are made to gradu- efforts. The question is whether the same knowingly i.e. it is a deliberate act. Dekker (2014) noted that the underre-

ally purchase the aircraft as opposed to an operating lease that is approach and thinking can be applied in a COUNTING ERRORS AS A SAFETY PER- porting that results from the implementa-

pure rental of the aircraft. He said there is also a hybrid version of safety critical environment? FORMANCE MEASURE tion of safety incentive programs, where

finance and operating lease. Those in favour of rewarding safety workers receive prizes or rewards when

He said the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft protocol had ‘behaviour’ feel that the rewards play an To demonstrate progress in safety, safety they do not report work-related injuries

played a big part in facilitating the lease of aircraft in a wide range important role in an organisation as an in- professionals and management embrace the or safety occurrences means that you are

of states such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt. strument that encourages safe work prac- belief that the absence or reduction of errors shooting yourself in the foot. As such an

The International Interests in Mobile Equipment set up an in- tices. The belief here is that rewards build is synonymous with [improved] progress organisation does not have a great safety

ternational registry of aircraft, which once ratified by the country, and maintain interest in working safely and in safety. As a result, those who have low culture because it has a low number of

meant that the aircraft owner had power of attorney that would insurance sector in the case of the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 act as a motivator for employees to work numbers of the negatives are rewarded. This incidents. Q

MH370 where the aircraft loss could not be clearly determined as
is not helpful when the goal is to ensure safe
allow for the recovery of the leased aircraft in the event of any the circumstances of the flight loss could not be concluded. This safer. Well, this may be true for well-de- operations at all levels in the organisation.

defaulting of lease payments. had led to an agreement where it was agreed that the loss was ‘a fined behaviours where people have total REFERENCES

The reliance on a single error rate as a

Previously such a dispute would be settled in court. war risk’ and concerned parties were compensated appropriately control with no external influence. An generic, all-purpose indicator of safety • Beus, J.M, Payne, S. C, Bergman, M & Arthur,

error, by definition, is something that an in-

W Jr, (2010) Safety Climate and Injuries: An

The repossession of the aircraft as per the convention is done but - this had led to an increment of war risks premiums. dividual does not have total control over as performance continues in spite of its many Examination of Theoretical and Empirical

directly by the lessor but after notification and confirmation by the She called for greater collaboration between aviation stakeholders it is influenced by a lot of things. It follows shortcomings. Evidence has demonstrat- Relationships. Journal of Applied Psychology,

civil aviation authority. that would lead to better risk mitigation and lower premiums for all then that rewarding something that we ed how employee reward schemes based 95(4): 713–727

Khan did note the concerns raised by some states like Nigeria, with group placements also considered as with the Gulf operators. do not have total control over may not be around reductions in safety occurrences • Dekker, S. (2014). The field guide to under-
standing ‘human error’ (3rd ed). Farnham,

where the state is a signatory to the convention but the process of She said the challenge of a low supply of insurance was due helpful. We know that to err is part of being are inherently flawed since many causal England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

repossession of the aircraft had not occurred as the CAA had not to the low number of players that meant higher premiums. She a human. Counting of errors is the measure factors are not within the employees’ • Hopkins, A. & S. Maslen (2015). Risky re-

facilitated the repossession. indicated that in cases of accidents of insured aircraft, contin- used to manage safety performance in control (Hopkins and Maslen, 2015; Reason, wards: how company bonuses affect safety.

United Kingdom, Ashgate.

This had led to some lessors to refuse to lease aircraft to Nigerian gency measures had to be provided for to handle the crisis from many organisations. 1997). A 2009 US Occupational Safety and • Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of

operators and this is an issue that should be addressed by African civil the first day till the conclusion. This should include instant cash Those who have reservations about Health Administration (OSHA) audit found Organisational Accidents, Ashgate, Hants,

aviation authorities like the AFCAC (African Civil Aviation Commission). mobilization until the review of the cause of accident, including the rewarding the negatives are of the view up to two-thirds of all workplace injuries Aldershot Publishing Ltd.

On the subject of aviation liability, best insurance practices in compensation to the airline, passengers and third parties. that this practice must be avoided if the and illnesses went unreported due to • Roughton, J., & Crutchfield, N. (2014). Safety

Africa, Felista Kagwanja -Kenya from airways manager Insurance, Participants called on the conference to address concerns like organisation is serious about safety culture. factors such as fear of disciplinary action or Culture: An innovative leadership approach.

Oxford, UK: Elsevier.

presented the state of aviation insurance and outlined the types the slow pace of certification of air operators by KCAA and other The view here is that these incentives, the loss of valued incentives (Beus, Payne, • Woods, D. D., Dekker, S., Cook, R., Johan-

of aviation insurance covers including the hull, third party, excess CAAs across Africa, the training of aviation legal professionals and reward the wrong behaviour, and over time Bergman & Artthur, 2010) nesen, L. & Sarter, N. (2010).

liability and specified covers. proper resolutions whose implementation can be reviewed at the become toxic to the effective functioning Where operated as collective arrange- Behind Human Error (2nd Ed.). Farnham,

She said described the unique challenges faced by the aviation next conference. Q of the management of safety. One of the ments, they can lead to peer pressure England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

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