Page 7 - Professorial Lecture - Prof Kasanda
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with  the  environment  and  with  one  another,  in  the  solving  of  practical
          problems and the human desire to transcend matters of simple survival…”
          (p. 1). “It is a subject without a knower” (Rowland, 2007, p. 101) and as
          such no one can claim to have monopoly of the mathematical knowledge.
          A simple example shows how we interact with mathematics in our daily
          lives.  We  use  or  call  upon  our  Mathematics  knowledge  though
          rudimentary when we decide which item to purchase in a supermarket or
          the time it will take for us to travel  from one town to the other or the
          money we will need to put a full tank of diesel or unleaded petrol in our
          car to travel to town B. An old lady in the most furthest rural Namibia uses
          mathematics when she sits down to plan how much of the pension money
          she  will  use  to  buy  food,  and  how  much  to  set  aside  until  the  next
          “payday”, estimating the speed of a car as we cross a street, or climbing
          on  a  chair  to  get  to  the  cookie  jar.  The  mathematics  we  use  might  be
          simple or complex depending on the situation. In all cases Mathematics is
          used either consciously or unconsciously.


          Ernest  (1971)  indicates  that  there  are  two  main  views  of  the  nature  of
          mathematics knowledge, absolutist (Platonist) and fallibilist. He notes that
          absolutists  believe  that  “mathematical  truth  is  absolutely  certain,  (and)
          that  mathematics  is  the  one  and  perhaps  the  only  realm  of  certain,
          unquestionable  and  objective  knowledge”  (p.  3).  On  the  other  hand,
          fallibilists  view  mathematical  truth  as  “corrigible,  and  can  never  be
          regarded as being above revision and correction” (p. 3). This view is that
          since mathematics is “man-made” it cannot be an absolute truth. Siegel
          and Borasi (1996) supporting the fallibilist view of mathematics knowledge
          note that:

                 …mathematical  results  can  only  be  sanctioned  by  the
                 mathematical  community  of  the  time  on  the  basis  of  existing
                 knowledge  and  evidence  as  well  as  agreed  upon  criteria…  The
                 history  of  mathematics  has  provided  some  notable  examples  of

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