Page 45 - HaMizrachi #10 Yom Yerushalayim - Shavuot 5779
P. 45

The Little-Known Reason
                                           Why the Six-Day War
                                              Started on June 5

This is the story of a little-            their three elite divisions and all      No decision was made about
         known and brilliant deception    their combat tank reserves into the      launching an attack, and Prime
         operation that succeeded in      southern zone.”                          Minister Levi Eshkol rejected Chief
determining the fate of the battle on                                              of Staff Rabin’s demand to convene
the Egyptian front even before a single   Miraculously, this left the Egyptians    the government immediately. The
shell was fired.                          open to attack and put the balance of    government would meet as usual, two
                                          numbers in favor of the IDF forces.      days later, on Sunday, June 4.
The Egyptian army’s deployment            For example, there were now only 82
in northern Sinai between May 16          Egyptian tanks against 380 Israeli       Despite this decision, the Prime
and May 23, 1967 had completely           tanks. With G-d’s help – and despite     Minister had a short meeting later
surprised IDF intelligence. They had      the initial intelligence failure – this  that day with Rabin, Defense Minister
assumed the Egyptians would deploy        was turning out to be the most           Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
in southern Sinai, hence Israeli efforts  brilliant deception operation the IDF    Abba Eban, Minister Yigal Allon, and
were going to be focused on the south.    had ever carried out.                    Ya’akov Herzog, Director-General of
                                                                                   the Prime Minister’s Office. Knowing
If the IDF had blindly acted upon this    Meanwhile, the atmosphere in             what was happening in Sinai, and
initial assumption, the consequences      Israel was tense. In trepidation of an   understanding that the increasing
could have been disastrous.               Egyptian onslaught and attacks on        confusion among the Egyptians
Fortunately though, they realized the     other fronts, makeshift cemeteries       would peak on Monday, June 5, Rabin
problem ahead of time.                    were being dug in public parks all over  proposed that the attack should not
                                          the country.                             begin before then.
Thus, the decision was made to carry
out deceptive operations to entice        The people expected their government     Two formal reasons would be given
the Egyptian command to deploy            to act fast.                             to the public for the delay: firstly
all of its forces in the south, far from                                           the need to wait for the return of
the bulk of the IDF soldiers. It was      Nevertheless, the undercover military    Mossad Chief Meir Amit from the
a sophisticated operation, which          operations had to be kept very secret,   US on Saturday night (because we
included the use of a scam division,      of course. If any hint of what was       must know “what the Americans
Division 49, under the command of         happening on the ground had leaked       think and if we have their support”),
Colonel Shlomo Amber. To confuse          into the media or on army radio, the     and secondly, the IDF still needs to
the Egyptians, they fashioned             Egyptians could have discovered the      complete “last-minute preparations.”
cardboard tanks and set up empty          plans and tragically transformed the
camps in the southern region.             outcome of the war… and the entire       We now know what these “last-
                                          future of the 19-year-old State of       minute preparations” were. Rabin’s
Meanwhile, Arik Sharon’s unit was         Israel…                                  recommendation was accepted.
moving large forces in the south
during the day and bringing them          At the same time, on the morning of      The deceptive maneuvers continued
back north under dim lights at night.     Friday, June 2, 1967, the Ministerial    undetected, Amit returned with a
Double agents were conveying false        Committee for Security Matters           detailed report, the Cabinet met on
intelligence to the enemy, giving them    convened in the War Room in Tel          Sunday morning and the following
the impression that Israel’s main         Aviv.                                    resolution was passed by a decisive
attack would indeed be launched in                                                 16-2 majority: “The government
the south.                                The meeting was highly charged           decides to take military action that
                                          and developed into an emotional          will lead to the release of Israel from
According to historian Aryeh              confrontation between the moderate       the increasingly tight military noose
Yitzchaki, after two or three days the    political leadership that championed     around its neck.”
Egyptians swallowed the bait, hook,       restraint and the military command
line and sinker: “They switched their     urging for a preemptive strike.          The rest, as we know, is history. And
deployment completely, and moved                                                   thank G-d for that.

                                                                                   •| 45
   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48