Page 45 - HaMizrachi #10 Yom Yerushalayim - Shavuot 5779
P. 45
The Little-Known Reason
Why the Six-Day War
Started on June 5
This is the story of a little- their three elite divisions and all No decision was made about
known and brilliant deception their combat tank reserves into the launching an attack, and Prime
operation that succeeded in southern zone.” Minister Levi Eshkol rejected Chief
determining the fate of the battle on of Staff Rabin’s demand to convene
the Egyptian front even before a single Miraculously, this left the Egyptians the government immediately. The
shell was fired. open to attack and put the balance of government would meet as usual, two
numbers in favor of the IDF forces. days later, on Sunday, June 4.
The Egyptian army’s deployment For example, there were now only 82
in northern Sinai between May 16 Egyptian tanks against 380 Israeli Despite this decision, the Prime
and May 23, 1967 had completely tanks. With G-d’s help – and despite Minister had a short meeting later
surprised IDF intelligence. They had the initial intelligence failure – this that day with Rabin, Defense Minister
assumed the Egyptians would deploy was turning out to be the most Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
in southern Sinai, hence Israeli efforts brilliant deception operation the IDF Abba Eban, Minister Yigal Allon, and
were going to be focused on the south. had ever carried out. Ya’akov Herzog, Director-General of
the Prime Minister’s Office. Knowing
If the IDF had blindly acted upon this Meanwhile, the atmosphere in what was happening in Sinai, and
initial assumption, the consequences Israel was tense. In trepidation of an understanding that the increasing
could have been disastrous. Egyptian onslaught and attacks on confusion among the Egyptians
Fortunately though, they realized the other fronts, makeshift cemeteries would peak on Monday, June 5, Rabin
problem ahead of time. were being dug in public parks all over proposed that the attack should not
the country. begin before then.
Thus, the decision was made to carry
out deceptive operations to entice The people expected their government Two formal reasons would be given
the Egyptian command to deploy to act fast. to the public for the delay: firstly
all of its forces in the south, far from the need to wait for the return of
the bulk of the IDF soldiers. It was Nevertheless, the undercover military Mossad Chief Meir Amit from the
a sophisticated operation, which operations had to be kept very secret, US on Saturday night (because we
included the use of a scam division, of course. If any hint of what was must know “what the Americans
Division 49, under the command of happening on the ground had leaked think and if we have their support”),
Colonel Shlomo Amber. To confuse into the media or on army radio, the and secondly, the IDF still needs to
the Egyptians, they fashioned Egyptians could have discovered the complete “last-minute preparations.”
cardboard tanks and set up empty plans and tragically transformed the
camps in the southern region. outcome of the war… and the entire We now know what these “last-
future of the 19-year-old State of minute preparations” were. Rabin’s
Meanwhile, Arik Sharon’s unit was Israel… recommendation was accepted.
moving large forces in the south
during the day and bringing them At the same time, on the morning of The deceptive maneuvers continued
back north under dim lights at night. Friday, June 2, 1967, the Ministerial undetected, Amit returned with a
Double agents were conveying false Committee for Security Matters detailed report, the Cabinet met on
intelligence to the enemy, giving them convened in the War Room in Tel Sunday morning and the following
the impression that Israel’s main Aviv. resolution was passed by a decisive
attack would indeed be launched in 16-2 majority: “The government
the south. The meeting was highly charged decides to take military action that
and developed into an emotional will lead to the release of Israel from
According to historian Aryeh confrontation between the moderate the increasingly tight military noose
Yitzchaki, after two or three days the political leadership that championed around its neck.”
Egyptians swallowed the bait, hook, restraint and the military command
line and sinker: “They switched their urging for a preemptive strike. The rest, as we know, is history. And
deployment completely, and moved thank G-d for that.
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