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also financial and institutional – between the state and its no clear and set norms on these and related matters. For
more traditional constituencies. If words such as “Zionism” some, the commitment to religion is very rudimentary,
and “nationalism” were once identified with the secular left, while the halachic observance and cultural isolation of the
today they possess a strong religious connotation, while Chardal (Charedi-nationalist) sector is indistinguishable
Israel’s culture now incorporates traditional imagery and from those of mainstream Charedi society.
vocabulary.
Even the more liberal wings of Religious Zionism have
The struggle between religion and secularism endures, moved rightward religiously. It has become a challenge to
of course, and in some respects has even intensified. Yet, find co-ed Religious Zionist schools, and many Bnei Akiva
the state is no longer clearly secular and neither is Isra- branches – to say nothing of the more right-wing youth
el’s dominant culture. The religious tensions are thus not groups – separate the sexes. Politically, the Religious Zionist
between the state and religious people, but rather internal community now fully recognizes the complexity of the
tensions within state institutions that are not due solely, state’s secularism. It understands that for the state to be
or even mostly, to Charedim. On the contrary, the state is no what it ought to be it needs active religious guidance. Its
longer considered by most of us to be a threat to Judaism. mere existence, even as the “blossoming of our redemption,”
The secular threat is identified today with other institu- is not enough.
tions, such as the militantly secular “New Israel Fund.”
The word “state” thus no longer inspires religious fear, and Most promising of all, perhaps, is the progress of the Reli-
militant secularism has been condensed to a relatively small gious Zionist rabbinate and its batei midrash. Yeshivah insti-
minority in Israel. tutions in the Religious Zionist sector have experienced a
renaissance of a sort the Charedi Torah world can mimic
The effects of these changes on the Charedi community and benefit from. Merkaz Harav and Yeshivat Har Etzion are
are readily apparent. Charedim are much more identified illustrious batei midrash, producing impressive figures such
with the state than they used to be, both in theory and in as Rabbi (Yosef Zvi) Rimon and Rabbi (Eliezer) Melamed.
practice. The Charedi public has become part of Israel’s Some alumni have gone on to start great institutions of
right-wing political bloc. It is no longer a “swing vote” in their own, and others have become prominent scholars in
Israeli politics, standing aloof from the country’s core issues all Torah areas.
while lobbying for its parochial interests. Younger Charedim
in particular identify with the State of Israel. They do not Is the difference relevant today?
feel the persecution or victimization that the older genera-
tion still remembers; if they do, they do not see themselves In light of this convergence, what, if anything, still justifies
as powerless to respond. In short, Charedim no longer view the distance between the Charedi beit midrash and the Reli-
the state as an implacably hostile monolith, but as a proj- gious Zionist one? The fierce philosophical and practical
ect that can be responsive to the Charedi point of view. debate over the state, which tore the religious community
Unsurprisingly, Charedim now often adopt a more respectful apart from within, has long subsided. Both Charedim and
approach to national days of mourning, and even holidays Religious Zionists understand that the State of Israel is
like Yom HaAtzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim. not (yet, at least) the anticipated final redemption; at the
same time, it does not preside over some kind of internal
Concomitantly, the Religious Zionist community has exile. Most members of both communities do not deny
undergone its own changes, converging with Charedim in the great significance of the state as part of a Divine plan
several respects. Feeling betrayed by a secular majority that of returning to Zion. Given the common ground between
defended Oslo and the disengagement from Gaza, many them, our communities’ alienation from each other seems
Religious Zionists view themselves as political dissidents. counter-productive.
The tagging of residents of Judea and Samaria as “settlers”
and “post-Zionist” trends on the Left have broken faith The truth, however, is that serious differences remain, and
between Religious Zionists and their old secular comrades. the path to reconciling them is long. Military service, and
On the whole, the Religious Zionist sector is far more aware the resentment of the Religious Zionist sector over Charedi
of the state’s deficiencies, both religious and practical. non-participation, is a profound divider. Moreover, the lib-
Today, Religious Zionists are often the hawks in the fight for eral wing of Religious Zionism, which is part and parcel of
the state’s religious character, even more so than Charedim. Religious Zionist society, makes reconciliation a difficult
task. There are too many rabbis in the Religious Zionist
On numerous fronts, the two communities have moved camp whose theological and halachic views are too close
towards one another. There were always some Charedi indi- for comfort to those of the American Conservative move-
viduals who were more open to Israel’s formal and informal ment. The association between Religious Zionists who take
institutions, but this trend has morphed from a small group religion seriously and those who do not reduces the chance
of individuals to a coherent, expanding community with for a rapprochement with Charedim. Despite the growing
its own identity and institutions. The internet, moreover, political schism within Religious Zionism, this remains a
has brought Charedim closer to certain elements of Israeli single community with porous boundaries.
culture, which used to reside outside the pale of Charedi
society. At the same time, Religious Zionists have become The Charedi fear that affiliation with Religious Zionism
far more diverse on matters of halachic stringency and the would channel some of that community’s religious liber-
distance from secular culture, to the degree that there are alism into the Charedi world is understandable. However,
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