Page 16 - HaMizrachi Tisha B'av 5782 USA
P. 16

also financial and institutional – between the state and its   no clear and set norms on these and related matters. For
                   more traditional constituencies. If words such as “Zionism”   some, the commitment to religion is very rudimentary,
                   and “nationalism” were once identified with the secular left,   while the halachic observance and cultural isolation of the
                   today they possess a strong religious connotation, while   Chardal (Charedi-nationalist) sector is indistinguishable
                   Israel’s culture now incorporates traditional imagery and   from those of mainstream Charedi society.
                   vocabulary.
                                                                    Even the more liberal wings of Religious Zionism have
                   The struggle between religion and secularism endures,   moved rightward religiously. It has become a challenge to
                   of course, and in some respects has even intensified. Yet,   find co-ed Religious Zionist schools, and many Bnei Akiva
                   the state is no longer clearly secular and neither is Isra-  branches – to say nothing of the more right-wing youth
                   el’s dominant culture. The religious tensions are thus not   groups – separate the sexes. Politically, the Religious Zionist
                   between the state and religious people, but rather internal   community now fully recognizes the complexity of the
                   tensions within state institutions that are not due solely,   state’s secularism. It understands that for the state to be
                   or even mostly, to Charedim. On the contrary, the state is no   what it ought to be it needs active religious guidance. Its
                   longer considered by most of us to be a threat to Judaism.   mere existence, even as the “blossoming of our redemption,”
                   The secular threat is identified today with other institu-  is not enough.
                   tions, such as the militantly secular “New Israel Fund.”
                   The word “state” thus no longer inspires religious fear, and   Most promising of all, perhaps, is the progress of the Reli-
                   militant secularism has been condensed to a relatively small   gious Zionist rabbinate and its batei midrash. Yeshivah insti-
                   minority in Israel.                              tutions in the Religious Zionist sector have experienced a
                                                                    renaissance of a sort the Charedi Torah world can mimic
                   The effects of these changes on the Charedi community   and benefit from. Merkaz Harav and Yeshivat Har Etzion are
                   are readily apparent. Charedim are much more identified   illustrious batei midrash, producing impressive figures such
                   with the state than they used to be, both in theory and in   as Rabbi (Yosef Zvi) Rimon and Rabbi (Eliezer) Melamed.
                   practice. The Charedi public has become part of Israel’s   Some alumni have gone on to start great institutions of
                   right-wing political bloc. It is no longer a “swing vote” in   their own, and others have become prominent scholars in
                   Israeli politics, standing aloof from the country’s core issues   all Torah areas.
                   while lobbying for its parochial interests. Younger Charedim
                   in particular identify with the State of Israel. They do not   Is the difference relevant today?
                   feel the persecution or victimization that the older genera-
                   tion still remembers; if they do, they do not see themselves   In light of this convergence, what, if anything, still justifies
                   as powerless to respond. In short, Charedim no longer view   the distance between the Charedi beit midrash and the Reli-
                   the state as an implacably hostile monolith, but as a proj-  gious Zionist one? The fierce philosophical and practical
                   ect that can be responsive to the Charedi point of view.   debate over the state, which tore the religious community
                   Unsurprisingly, Charedim now often adopt a more respectful   apart from within, has long subsided. Both Charedim and
                   approach to national days of mourning, and even holidays   Religious Zionists understand that the State of Israel is
                   like Yom HaAtzmaut and Yom Yerushalayim.         not (yet, at least) the anticipated final redemption; at the
                                                                    same time, it does not preside over some kind of internal
                   Concomitantly, the Religious Zionist community has   exile. Most members of both communities do not deny
                   undergone its own changes, converging with Charedim in   the great significance of the state as part of a Divine plan
                   several respects. Feeling betrayed by a secular majority that   of returning to Zion. Given the common ground between
                   defended Oslo and the disengagement from Gaza, many   them, our communities’ alienation from each other seems
                   Religious Zionists view themselves as political dissidents.   counter-productive.
                   The tagging of residents of Judea and Samaria as “settlers”
                   and “post-Zionist” trends on the Left have broken faith   The truth, however, is that serious differences remain, and
                   between Religious Zionists and their old secular comrades.   the path to reconciling them is long. Military service, and
                   On the whole, the Religious Zionist sector is far more aware   the resentment of the Religious Zionist sector over Charedi
                   of the state’s deficiencies, both religious and practical.   non-participation, is a profound divider. Moreover, the lib-
                   Today, Religious Zionists are often the hawks in the fight for   eral wing of Religious Zionism, which is part and parcel of
                   the state’s religious character, even more so than Charedim.   Religious Zionist society, makes reconciliation a difficult
                                                                    task. There are too many rabbis in the Religious Zionist
                   On numerous fronts, the two communities have moved   camp whose theological and halachic views are too close
                   towards one another. There were always some Charedi indi-  for comfort to those of the American Conservative move-
                   viduals who were more open to Israel’s formal and informal   ment. The association between Religious Zionists who take
                   institutions, but this trend has morphed from a small group   religion seriously and those who do not reduces the chance
                   of individuals to a coherent, expanding community with   for a rapprochement with Charedim. Despite the growing
                   its own identity and institutions. The internet, moreover,   political schism within Religious Zionism, this remains a
                   has brought Charedim closer to certain elements of Israeli   single community with porous boundaries.
                   culture, which used to reside outside the pale of Charedi
                   society. At the same time, Religious Zionists have become   The Charedi fear that affiliation with Religious Zionism
                   far more diverse on matters of halachic stringency and the   would channel some of that community’s religious liber-
                   distance from secular culture, to the degree that there are   alism into the Charedi world is understandable. However,


    16  |
   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21