Page 77 - Historical Summaries (Persian Gulf) 1907-1953

mm HBBCB •ac=

71
Abbas to Shiraz might prove financially advan­
tageous, while it would soem to offer no strategic
objections from the point of view of the defence
of India. Such a line would absorb all the
traffic which has hitherto passed from Bushiro
and Ahwaz to tho north of Persia, and would
result in the material improvement of the port
of Bunder Abbas, now in the British sphere, and
greatly increase its value and importance. The
Concession might include the right to continue
the lino to Ahwaz or elsewhere in Arabistun, and
to effect a junction with tho Bagdad Railway—
such extension to bo left to tho discretion of the
concession nai re.
“ An alternative scheme, which deserves
examination, is whether it would bo either
desirable or practicable to unite the Indiun
railway system with the Bagdad Railway.
“This scheme raises strategic considerations
which fall within tho province of the Govern­
ment of India and the Committee of Imperial
Dcfcnco.
** It may well be thought expedient, for
strategic reasons, to oppose altogether the
progress of railway construction towards the
Indian frontier. Bo this as it may, it would
appear that the difficulty of meeting German
competition in tho neutral zone in Persia is
likely to incrcaso from year to year, and it may
prove that a railway such as that referred to
would, in British hands, be the most effective
means of anticipating a German commercial
advance into Southern Persia in tile future, thus
becoming the source of protection rather than of
weakness in the defence of India.
“ Ar to the economic aspects of the scheme, it
may be regarded as likely that the existence of
such a line would make British co-operation in
the Bagdad Railway more welcome to the
Germans, sinco it would increase the volume of
through traffic. While passengers would hesitate
to travel by the Bagdad Railway with tho
necessity of breaking the journey on arrival ut
the Porsian Gulf, the convenience of a through
enrriago from Calais to India could not fail to
make itself felt; further, tho economy of time
would be considerable, and of especial value in
the transmission of mails.
“The objections of the Russian Government
might be such as to render the enterprise in­
advisable, though these objections could noc
[I0U8] 13