Page 101 - Gulf Precis (VI)_Neat

Chapter III. 79
Abdul Aziz’s tribes was a great success and rosultcd in considerable booty.
Followed by Abdul Aziz with a largo force, and worsted in an encounter which
appears, however, to have been only a potty skirmish, he retired with his men
and most of his loot to Turkish territory.
164. Abdul Aziz, taking what was obviously tho correct course, proceeded
to tho nearest Telegraph Office, at Suk-cs-Shuyukh, and, put himself into com m u-
nication with tho Vali of Basrah, to whom he complained of the misdeeds of
Sadun, a Turkish subject, and demanded redress. This Molisin Pasha promised
with alacrity, but ho docs not seem to have taken any energetic steps to carry
out his undertaking. Sadun was said at tho time to have lied into tho marshes,
but from his subsequent movements, it is evident that lie could have retired
to any very great distance from the desert path to Koweit. After some days’
fruitless waiting, Abdul Aziz got impatient and threatened that, unless the
Wali procured him immediate satisfaction, he would proceed forthwith to
Koweit, and take it out of Mubarak, whom he regarded as tho real author of
the attacks made on him.
165. Tho main facts were telegraphed by Mr. do Bunson to London on the
1st November, with a recommendation that a gunboat should go to Koweit to
watch events. A previous telegram from Consul Shipley had reported matters
at Koweit to bo quiet and hostilities suspended ; and a subsequent message
(dated 2nd November) from Mr. de Bunsen withdrew his recommendation on
the ground that the situation had improved, and that the Amir had promised
to remain quiet pending settlement of his claims by an Imperial Commissioner.
On the 9th November, therefore, the India Office recommended to the Foreign
Office that no further action should be taken for the present; but a less reassur­
ing account of the state of affairs having been received from the Admiralty
on tho following day (10th November), the India Office again addressed the
Foreign Office (14th November), suggesting that a British Agent should bo
sent in a ship of war to ascertain the true state of affairs and to endeavour to
warn the Amir of Ncjd that no attack on Koweit would be allowed. It was
further suggested that should it prove impossible to resist a land attack with
the force available at tho moment, the Sheikh should be offered a refuge and
Bteps taken as soon as possible to repulse the invaders. Further news was
received on tho samo day that an attack on Koweit by the Amir of Nejd was
considered improbable, but possible ; and that the Turks were reinforcing their
garrison at Basrah. The Foreign Office agreed to the despatch of a gunboat,
but added that no active measures should bo taken without further reference
to Her Majesty’s Government. The Government of India were then instructed
in Secretary of State’s telegram dated 15th November 1900—
“ Foreign OfRcc arc informing Admiralty that vessel should be detailed to take an Agent
to Koweit to enquire state of affairs and pndeavour
No. 46 of Secret E., Fcbruury 1901, No». 22*107.
to warn Nejd Amir, if necessary, not to attack
Koweit. Preliminary steps will be taken by Admiralty to protect Sheikh if attacked, but no
active measures for this purposo will be taken and no force landed to expel invader without
furthor reference to Her Majesty’s Government. I presume you will inform Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief and send Resident, Bushire/’
166. Meanwhile Mubarak’s warlike preparations had been completed, and
he proceeded to march northwards to meet Abdul Aziz. Thalib Pasha was
then again despatched by the Vali of Basrah in hot hasto to hold him back,
but found lie had already started. At the same time reinforcements wore sent
to the Turkish troops in the Montefik district, both from Basrah and Baghdad
and Saiyid Ahmed Pasha was sent along with Ali Bessam, the Amir's Basrah
Agont, to see Abdul Aziz, and do their best to induce him to go homo, and
leave his grievances in the hands of the Turks.
167. Sadun was now at Sakria, and Abdul Aziz near Samava in the Vilayet
of Baghdad. The forces of Mubarak and Sadun effected a junction without
Political Rc.ident'.t.i.prnni, dated l.th No.™- difficulty, and once united were
btr loco, No. 42 of secret e, Foiruary 1901, Kos. equal, if not slightly superior in numbor,
2Z’107, to the troops Abdul Aziz then had on the
spot, This consideration joined to tho prcsenco of a considerable Turkish force