Page 98 - Gulf Precis (VI)_Neat

76
Part I.
Atnnlla Effendi may possibly be chosen. Tliia man belongs to tlio Ulema class and eniov
high reputation for astuteness and capacity for intrigue. IIo is on good terms with the
Montifik Sheikhs, nnd is believed to have inspired the measures, which onabled the late Vali
Abdul Rahara Pasha to effect last year a temporary settlement of the Montifik grievances
Probably, therefore, ho is tho best man to send ; ho will promise everything, and if ho oan
suocccd in dividing tho interests of the different Sheikhs or induce them to believo onco moro
in tho possibility oE the Ottoman Government fulfilling its engagements, the difficulty mar
be tided over. At any rate, timo will be gained, and this is a point of no small importance,
for if tho plague ceases presently, as people hope, nnd the quarantine is removed, a number of
troops will become available for repressive operations. There remains tho other expedient of
appointing Faleli Pasha, or somo other member of the Al-Sadoon (the ruling family of the
Montifik tribo), Mutessarif of Nnsariyah. IE this mensuru be adopted, tranquillity will be at
onco restored, and tho rovonucs of the rich tract occupied by the Montifik will bo realized
with moro or less punctuality. The objection is, that if the Al-Sadoon arc invested with* civil
authority as rocognizcd Government olfioials in addition to the power which they exercise as
Sheikhs of a numerous nnd wealthy tribe, they will become strong enough to set at naught
superior authority, and, possibly, securo their independence.
8. No doubt this view of the case deserves consideration ; nevertheless, I hold that, evon
from tho Ottoman standpoint, the appointment of one of tho Al-Sadoon as Mutessarif of
Nasariya is tho best expedient of which tho circumstances admit. Its immediate effect in
calming local agitation is certain; it will put the Turks in funds, and give them time to make
their preparations for dealing effectually with the Al-Sadoon in case the latter should show
eigus of au inteution to lift their heads too high.
Moroover, the Al-Sadoon cannot acquire their much-dreaded influence in day; their
principal SboiUh, Nasir Pasha, is in honourable dotcr.tion at Constantinople, while the Sheikhs
on the spot are mutually jealous, and could, by skilful management, be pitted against each
other in the ordinary Oriental fashion. At tho present juncture, a temporizing poiicy seems
to me essential, for although the Turkish troops at Nasariya do no exceed 1,500 men, the
Infantry 300. CaTolry 300, Artillery £50, total garrison at Baghdad has been reduced to tbo
850 mun. number shown in the margin, and could not safely
spare any reinforcements. Of two expedients to gain time that one appears preferable which
offers tbo greatest certainty of relief from presont embarrassments, while the danger which
may possibly result from it is remote, aud can be watched and guarded against. And it is
better for the Turks to do voluntarily and with a good grace that which, if the mission of
Ataalla Effendi should fail, they may otherwise have to do ou compulsion.
4. I venture to add the following observations on the course which it might be advantage­
ous to our interest in tlicso parts to pursue. Tho Montifik are the wealthiest and most power­
ful tribe in Southern Mesopotamia, and dominate the whole Lower Euphrates down to the
walls of Busrah, a place of growing commercial importance, and possessing a considerabla trad**
both with Western India and England. Their influence might, under ccrlqin eventualities, be of
the utmost value to our interests, and their friendship is worth an effort to secure.
For example, if tho Montifik Sheikhs had been in power at Nasariya, I question whether
the ,rKhalifaliw# outrage would ever have occurred, and their co-opcration now affords pro­
bably the best chance of capturing Seyhood, the ringleader in that affair. If, through British
intervention, the Yilayat of Busrah could be reconstituted—it was only abolished last year in
consequence of the failure of Zabit Pasha's repressive policy towards the Montifik—and Nasir
Pasha be reappointed Vali, there would he au end of these disturbances on the Lower Tigris
aud Euphrates which have done so much injury to local commerce, aud we should have at
Busrah a strong and capable ruler, friendly to British interests, unless his character has
changed during Ins enforced stay nt Constantinople, in place of a Vali. 500 miles off at
Baghdad, who is enfeebled by old age, and those principal characteristic is a fanatical dislike
to all Europeans. If this measure is not feasihle, the next best arrangement would be the
I appointment of Falch Pasha as Matassarif of Nasariya.
We are concerned in the matter, not only for political reasons, but also in defence of
commercial interests which are seriously damaged by the continuance of strife between t e
Turks and the Arabs, which makes the Tigris unsafe, and renders possible the occurrence o
such outrages as the attack last year on the ,( Kkalifah."
148. In accordanoo with Mr. Plowdcn’s suggestions Lord Duffcrin proposed
to Assim Pasha (Foreign Minister) the
Ibid Ko. 243.
appointment of Nasir Pasha as Vali o
Basrah, or il that arrangement was not possible, of his son Faleli Pasha as
Mutassirif of Nasariya. Assim Pasha explained that the jealousy among
Montefik Arabs was so great, that it was very difficult to arrive at a pern*.alien
settlement and that Nasir Pasha's appointment had been already tried an
failed (Lord Duffcrin’s despatch No. 613, dated 26th July 1881).

• Sro Chapter XX (Hi).