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36 PERSIAN GULP ADMINISTRATION BErORT
With the victory at Shaiba, on the 14th of April, the situation, became
less acute. The Turko-Arab force retreated to the lCarkch and the Bawia sub
mitted. . The subsequent arrival of a Division at Ahwaz and the punishmont of
the Beni Turuf had a sufficiently quieting influence to allow of tlio ropair of
the pipe line boing taken in hand in May.
At the beginning of June, the head-quarters of the Vico-Consulato was
transferred from Mokamincrali to Ahwaz.
During the summer months, several raids by the Arabs of the Mian Ab
wore made on the pipe line. The Cliaab of Faraiych-i-Faisal and Haidor-i-
Talayil were chiefly suspected. A very bold raid in August On a camp at the
top of the Tull Kha Yat resulted in the loss of some 20 mules and other gear
and led to the occupation of Band-i-Qir by two Squadrons of the 23rd Cavalry
from Ahwaz. This step had the desired effect as no more raids took place
during the year.
The punishmont of the Beni Turuf had a very good effect on the Arabs of
the Mian Ab. During the winter 1915-16, His Britannic Majesty’s Vice-
Consul was enabled to visit every Shaikh and tribe of any importance between
Ahwaz and Dizful, which had never been possible in previous years.
Owing to the removal of the head-quarters from Ahwaz to Moliammerah,
no summer tour being undertaken by His
IValitiiri Affair r
Britannic Majesty’s Vice-Consul and,
finally, the transference of Bakhtiari affairs in the month of July to His Britan
nic Majesty’s Consul-General, Ispahan, the connection of the Ahwaz Vice-
Consul with Bakhtiaristan was to a great extent severed.
Sirdar-i-Jang, the Illkhani, and Sirdar Bahadur, acting Illbegi, remained
in the low country till late in May. The former’s behaviour gave early cause
for anxiety. Although not openly hostile, he was nevertheless strongly biassed
against the allied cause, partly owing to his long-standing cncmity with our
Ally the Shaikh of Mohammerah but chiefly owing to his fanatical interpretation
of his duty to Islam. During the months of February and March, he made
great efforts, in conjunction with Shaikh Murteza of Shushter, to spread the
jehad movement among the Arabs, he refused our request that he should stop
Wassmuss and his party from going to Ramuz and Behbekan, and he would not
agree to sending Bakhtiari sowars to protect the pipe line in Northern Arabistan.
Later in the year, documentary evidence came to hand -which clearly showed
that Jang had actively incited the Arabs to join theyehad movement of the
early spring.
The Jllkbani and Illbegi met the Chief Political Officer in the latter half
of May at Darreh-i-Khazineh. The object of the meeting was to obtain an
undertaking from the Khans that they would remain neutral, no matter what
the attitude of their Government should be. It seemed at first as if the Khans
might acquiesce to our terms but, after some vaccillation, they took refuge
behind the plea that they could not pledge the tribe without the knowledge and
consent of their brother Khans. Finally, however, a compromise was reached
in an agreement to guarantee the safety and lives of the British community at
the fields, and to afford 20 days’ notice in case the Khans were unable to con
tinue to protect our settlement at Musjid-i-Suleiman.
After leaving Darreh Khazineh, the Khans met Haji Rais at Ramuz but
without any satisfactory results from the point of view of either the Shaikh or
ourselves. Ramuz continued as a recognised asylum for the Shaikh’s disloyal
subjects, who, issuing forth from the shelter afforded them, raided the Shaikh’s
loyal tribes.
Not long after the Khans arrived at Ispahan, in June, a strong^ movement
against Jang sprang up which finally resulted in his having to relinquish the
Illkhanisbip. Jang had made many enemies who were not slow to turn on
him, when they realised that he had forfeited our good offices.
Sirdar-i-Muhtasham was chosen as Illkhani and ho received our support-
The question of the lllbegiship was a more difficult ono. Tho two chief candi
dates were Amir Jang and Amir Mujahid. The latter, in spite of his reputa
tion—he had been characterised in a Tohran telegram as a “liar and a