Page 20 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

However, reducing the warning time will have substantial impact on the ability of Japan, S. Korea, and US
bases like Okinawa, Guam, etc. to activate defense systems like Patriots that defend relatively small
footprints like military bases.

Extant anti-ballistic missiles like Patriots and sea based Standard Missiles are only “moved out” on alert, with
only a small percentage of the systems held at high levels of readiness.

PRC use of “terminal” and “mid-course” terms, rather than being technical errors, it is exactly the right term to
describe the course of ballistic missile attacks on Japan and major US bases like Okinawa. PRC knows that
early warning and cueing data from THAAD can be flowed to Patriots and Aegis in an integrated ABM
system.

If the PRC’s intent is to be able to launch a nuclear first strike at installations protected by Patriots and
Aegis systems, then their objection to THAAD is technically sound.
Rather than being threatened by a handful of THAAD interceptors, Beijing’s plans for a nuclear missile
attack on Japan would be frustrated by far more numerous Patriot and Aegis interceptors.

If they are given sufficient warning to be deployed.

It is well known that PRC have substantial inventories of medium and short range ballistic missiles.

A nuclear ballistic missile first strike offers the opportunity to destroy the conventional arms capability of US
and allies in the region in a lighting first strike.

If the PRC actually have thousands of warheads as opposed to 250 alleged by a number of arms control
advocates, a nuclear first strike aimed at allied military installations makes sense.

The PRC’s nuclear arsenal is not subject to any arms control agreements, or any credible verification.

Perhaps Beijing is not as toothless or benign as they want the world to believe.
Second Line of Defense

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