Page 22 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

jurisdiction of other sovereign states or other entities, and that the PRC is powerless to enforce its sovereignty
claims against armed foreign vessels operating in its “indisputably sovereign” territory.

In other words, the PRC regime do not necessarily exercise sovereignty in the Western sense in territories
Beijing considers as theirs with “indisputable” sovereignty, let alone the capacity to enforce trade deals it
makes on behalf of their “local” governments.

Since the Beijing regime does not consider a monopoly on violence a necessary and essential feature of
“indisputable sovereignty”, there is no reason for Western analysts to project onto the Beijing regime Western
notions of what sovereignty means and abide by Western rules that Beijing in fact, does not subscribe to
themselves.

Few Western observers recognize that the PRC in fact practices many “one China” policies that no
Westphalian state would have accepted.

The PRC has accepted the international recognition of the existence of Taiwan, the Republic of China
exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan; and, a similar arrangement for Hong Kong, codified by United States laws
like the Hong Kong Policy Act (P.L. No. 102-383m 106 Stat. 1448), and the WTO membership of “Chinese,
Taipei” and “Hong Kong, China” that gave international legal recognition to them as a distinct jurisdictions
from Beijing that have their own membership and voting rights.

Beyond these examples, the PRC regime’s monopoly on legitimate power is internally constrained by their
proclamation of “autonomous regions” that include vast stretches like Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Xinjiang,
and “Special Economic Zones” that include many cities and provinces.

Ostensibly, Beijing is a “unitary state” that has no formal, constitutional division of powers between the central
government and local authorities like Provinces and in theory, Beijing is supreme.

The reality is Beijing is a very weak center that more often than not, in most matters, act on a quasi-advisory
basis to local authorities as long as they display the symbols of obedience and acknowledgement of PRC rule
such as displaying the PRC flag.

Beijing’s power to appoint a handful of top officials to “local” governments is not sufficient to ensure that the
local authorities do not do their own thing when the Beijing appointees are not looking — which is most of the
time.

There is no clear federal or constitutional boundary as to what are the divisions of power between the Beijing
regime and the “local” governments or “autonomous regions”.

In practice, it is as much what the “local” or “autonomous” authority can get away with.

That brings us to the problem as to just what powers Beijing have to, a) negotiate on behalf of their “local”
authorities, b) enforce any obligations assumed by Beijing (e.g. removing local tariffs and trade barriers).

It is not at all clear that an agreement or treaty signed with the Beijing regime is any more binding than a
treaty signed with the Republic of China like the United Nations Charter of 1945 or the GATT signed in
1947. Any sensible observer would have recognized that GATT signed with the ROC made no sense in 1947
when the ROC was not in control of large swaths of China. Yet GATT negotiators had no problem with ROC’s
accession to GATT.

The West is now in the process of repeating this mistake.

Second Line of Defense

Page 21