Page 36 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

By Danny Lam
The South China Sea “Sea Grab” is no less an egregious violation of international law than a “Land Grab” by
Russia in the Ukraine.

Both cases are virtually identical in that a treaty defined international boundary or limitation was violated.
Though in the SCS case, it was, a priori, violated by multiple overlapping claimants.

Both cases upended the post-war norm that international boundaries should not be altered by force.
Yet the international community’s response has been tepid and limpid in SCS when it involves China’s island
creation on features and formal military occupation. The result is hardly any different from Russia’s “green
men” seizing control of the Crimea, running a “referendum” and then annexing the territory.

Negotiations with Beijing and the competing claimants, Creating Codes of conduct, Lawfare, Strengthening
regional allies Brokered settlements, FONOPs by the US have all been tried to moderate the behavior of the
competing parties and none of these have worked for any length of time or to any degree.

There are substantial differences in Chinese behavior in the SCS compared to other territorial disputes with
India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Russia.

In theory, the “unequal treaty” and “century of humiliation” propaganda narrative of the CCP would suggest
that the claim over 1 million km2 of resource rich land lost to Russia would be highest on their “recovery”
priority after Taiwan.

But in practice, there is little or no correlation between Beijing’s priority from any number of rational actor
calculations and how and what particular issues are pursued.
ADIZs are imposed over East China Sea and not followed in SCS. Island hopping and land reclamation is not
pursued in disputes with Japan and Korea. No action is taken against Russia. That speaks to the importance of
local factors and interests.

That begs the question of what are the local interests driving PRC behavior in the SCS beside Beijing?

While certain issues are clearly local, such as the rapid depletion of fishing stocks concomitant with explosive
growth of highly subsidized fishing fleets or the existence of oil and gas resources. Other issues revolve
around securing the approaches to the Hainan Island naval base have strategic dimensions.

The formal “take over” of the Republic of China narrative and claim only happened in the 1990s after the
PRC signed and acceded to the UNCLOS, which should have in theory, extinguished the ROC claims and also
provided a framework for negotiated settlements with other claimants. Yet that is not to be.

Today, the PRC is at once, the largest beneficiary of rights of freedom of navigation around the world
granted under UNCLOS, and the largest single beneficiary of protection given to Chinese shipping by the US
and Allies around the world.
China, in that respect, is the largest and most egregious free rider in the world. China benefits immensely
from UNCLOS worldwide, but when it comes to Chinese obligations under UNCLOS in the South China Sea,
their failure to deliver on treaty obligations is obvious.

Whereas Russia was immediately and in no uncertain terms condemned and sanctioned for their behavior in
the Crimea and Ukraine, China, to date have suffered no consequences whatsoever for the same behavior
Second Line of Defense

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