Page 38 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

Little noticed was that human wave attacks by Chinese troops were mostly former soldiers for the KMT regime
that the CCP regarded as disloyal and security risks. Incoming dynasties customarily disposed of troops loyal
to former regimes by making them front line troops. The CCP tasked them to invade Taiwan, be PVA in
Korea, or otherwise deployed on frontier adventures.

When that supply ran low and the CCP began to have to use the much smaller cadres of trusted communist
PLA troops, CCP enthusiasm for the war dwindled very quickly.

Incidents that devastated the morale of Mao Tse-Tung and members of the ruling circle escaped notice in the
west. For example, Mao Anying, the elder surviving (and only fit) son of Mao Tse-tung who was killed in
Korea on November 25, 1950 by an UN Airstrike in a supposedly safe rear area was not well recognized
and exploited.

Had PVA command and control nodes that are staffed by loyal CCP cadres with ties to high ranking officials
been specifically targeted, it would disproportionately impacted regime behavior.

The weakness of detailed local knowledge has hindered US policy toward China in general, resulting missed
opportunities.

Detailed knowledge of familial, clan, provincial, ethnic, linguistic and other ties is what is needed to
understand Chinese signals and meanings and to dissect local from so called national interests.

When President Xi Jinping told President Elect Trump by phone, “facts have shown that cooperation is the only
correct choice”, it could be interpreted in at least two ways:
Pleading for cooperation as opposed to conflict between the between United States and the People’s
Republic of China; or, Preserving a monopoly by Beijing on relations with the United States.

It follows from this that President Xi is pleading for is for the Trump Administration to not bypass Beijing on
key issues and to endorse the CCP/PRC monopoly of power that, de facto, it may or may not have.

In Western diplomacy, acceptance of a recognized regime’s monopoly on legitimate power is explicit and
recognized regimes are rarely bypassed even when facts on the ground clearly dictate otherwise, like the
interregnum between the proclamation of the PRC in 1949 and de-recognition of the Republic of China (ROC)
in 1978.
Second Line of Defense

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