Page 42 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

The disputes over South China Sea in the 2000s have regional drivers and origins that are ill understood
outside of China. The western “China expert” priesthood, by focusing on interactions with Beijing, have
largely missed this regional dimension.

In order to better understand regional dynamics, western analysts have to develop linguistic skills, contacts,
and analytical perspective native to the Guangdong / Southern China region. Yet, few of the China
priesthood are fluent in languages like Cantonese, tagalore, Bahasa, etc. – the lingua franca of south china
sea nations.

Whereas it is generally reckoned that every electronic device within Zhongnanhai is in theory capable of
being monitored, resulting in a good understanding of the personnel and decision making processes in Beijing,
there is a paucity of intelligence as to the actors, motives, and intentions that are driving the moves attributed
to Beijing in the South China Sea.

In many instances, we do not know much beyond the names of military commanders except for the top
officials of the military region or regional constabulary (which is most likely a Beijing appointee).

Without details as to the personnel down to the third or lower tiers of command, their relationships to other
interested parties (e.g. Coast Guard, Fisheries Patrol) and the businesses that have interests in the issue,
particularly the local PLA/PLAN owned or controlled firms, and their relationship with regional counterparts, it
is difficult to understand their behavior and policy making process.

For example, we cannot judge the relative weights of fisheries, hydrocarbon resources, local (vs. PRC) defense
considerations, vs. face, pride, institutional momentum, and other motives that is driving the ostensibly PRC-
Beijing policies for land reclamation and other sovereignty assertion activities.

Consequently, western analysts are strained to explain how the PRC can declare an expansive AIDC in East
China Sea, and apparently have little interest to do so in the South China Sea that they claim as “blue earth”
worthwhile enough to invest substantial resources to reclaim land and fortify.

Nor do we understand how the 9 dash claim was inherited by the PRC, with Beijing endorsing and adjusting
the claim by placing it on passports and maps.

A plausible explanation of such divergences in behavior is there are at least three different local
governments/local PLA/PLAN driving maritime policy, with different calculations and thought processes and
different interactions with Beijing who strain to explain this as a consistent policy to the “barbarians”.

Thus, while the Shanghai clique have traditionally driven the policy of non-negotiable claims regarding
sovereignty over Taiwan by Beijing, there is little impetus to push on the issue of Okinawan independence as
an issue for Beijing from the local governments (Tsingtao/Qingdao) or the new Northern Command military
region directly concerned.

Similarly, the deafening silence on PRC’s claims to lands ceded to Russia that in fact, have a stronger basis in
their renegotiating opposition to unequal treaties is a contradictory policy that cannot be understood without
consideration of local policies and calculations of cost and benefits.

The keys to solving these puzzles is recognition that the People’s Republic of China’s Beijing regime has
evolved very much into a classical Chinese regime where the power of the central government is more
symbolic than real.

Second Line of Defense

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