Page 39 - Rethinking China Policy

Rethinking China Policy

With a limited agenda between the US and PRC well into the early 1980s, beginning with Kissinger’s
initiatives and Nixon’s visit in 1972 it was readily managed and tightly controlled by the Priesthood of
Western “China scholars”.

This arrangement worked well before the “opening” of China by Deng Xiaoping that unleashed a China that
much more closely resemble China historically, where local authorities are subservient to the Emperor in name,
and are free to do much as they pleased as long as the Emperor received their taxes and the visible
manifestations of obedience to Beijing were adhered to.

Chinese civilization of the 21st Century, however, found the priesthood of Western China Experts that focused
on Beijing increasingly out of touch with the widening and divergent interests of different parts of China.

Beijing centric interpretations of policies have faced challenges in explaining the lack of consistency in regime
behavior across regions:

For example, the declaration of an ADIZ in East China Sea was not matched by similar moves in South China
Sea. Nor are the island building ventures in South China Sea replicated elsewhere.

Divergences like this raise questions as to what are the local dynamics that are driving Chinese policies, rather
than Beijing’s official policies.

China experts, because of their predominant training in one dialect and their preponderance in a few major
Chinese cities, are an obstacle for a more nuanced understanding and foreign policy under the Trump
Administration toward the many Chinese “local” authorities.

Crafting a nuanced set of foreign policies toward the different parts of China that simultaneously recognizes
the limitations of Beijing’s power and influence, and the diversity of interests, behavior and concerns that make
up the vast Chinese civilization require an expansion of capacity and broadening of expertise that will take
time.

Meanwhile, acceding to Xi’s demand for a monopoly plays right into Beijing’s hands as it enable the regime to
play off issues like the North Korean Nuclear Threat, South China Sea Grab, Trade, Currency, Climate
Change and many other issues all at once with a Washington Foreign Policy priesthood eager for diplomatic
“solutions”.

In Western diplomacy, the dominant paradigm is to compartmentalize differences and disputes to within a
particular policy area, and to limit / prevent its bleed / spread to other issues. If there is a trade dispute
that is not settled amicably through legitimate mechanisms, sanctions by one party are limited to that trade
area.

Example: France once restricted customs clearance of Japanese VCRs to one small custom post, causing
month’s long tie-ups. Japan retaliated by issuing a “health” regulation that Perrier water had to be boiled.

Notably, at the height of US-Japan trade disputes in the 1980s, the military-strategic relation was never
impaired or disrupted. China, and particularly the Beijing regime, however, do not follow this protocol.

Astute observers will notice that there is a noticeable correlation between the diminishing of US and Allied
pressure on China in key areas like trade, currency manipulation, intellectual property theft, state-sponsored
hacking, human rights, and the flaring up of strategic issues like North Korea, South China Sea, confrontations
with Japan, etc.

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