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A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Second Edition.


            House,  National  Security  Strategy  38  (2010),  available at   at   https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1072456/
            https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/  download; Complaint, SEC v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 06-cv-2942 (S.D.N.Y.
            rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.          2006),  ECF  No.  1  [hereinafter  SEC v. Tyco Int’l],  available at
                                                                http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19657.
            7      See, e.g.,  Int’l  Chamber  of  Commerce,  et  al.,  Clean   pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 08-cv-1494 (S.D.
            Business    Is  Good  Business:  The  Business  Case  Against   Tex. 2008), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Willbros], available at
            Corruption  (2008),  available  at  https://d306pr3pise04h.  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20571.
            cloudfront.net/docs/news_events%2F8.1%2Fclean_business_  pdf.
            is_good_business.pdf;  World  Health  Org.,  Reinforcing the
            Focus on Anti-corruption,  Transparency  and Accountability   11   See United States v. Ahsani, supra note 9 (engaging
            in National Health  Policies,  Strategies  and Plans  (2019),   in  bid-rigging);  Plea  Agreement,  United States  v. Bridgestone
            available at  https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/hand  Corp.,  No.  11-cr-651  (S.D.  Tex.  2011),  ECF  No.  21,  available
            le/10665/326229/9789241515689-eng.pdf?ua=1.         at  https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/
                                                                legacy/2011/10/18/10-05-11bridgestone-plea.pdf.
            8      See,  e.g.,  The Corruption  Eruption,  Economist
            (Apr.  29,  2010),  available  at  http://www.economist.com/  12   See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 95-640,
            node/16005114 (“The hidden costs of corruption are almost   at 4; see also A. Carl Kotchian, The Payoff: Lockheed’s 70-Day
            always  much  higher  than  companies  imagine.  Corruption   Mission to Tokyo, Saturday Rev., Jul. 9, 1977, at 7.
            inevitably  begets  ever more corruption:  bribe-takers  keep
            returning  to the trough  and  bribe-givers  open  themselves   13   U.S.  Sec.  and  Exchange  Comm.,  Report  of  the
            up  to  blackmail.”);  Daniel  Kaufmann  and  Shang-Jin  Wei,   Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and
            Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?  2   Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices 2-3 (1976).
            (Nat’l  Bureau  of  Econ.  Research,  Working  Paper  No.  7093,
            1999),  available at  http://www.nber.org/papers/w7093.pdf   14   See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114,
            (“Contrary to the ‘efficient grease’ theory, we find that firms   at 3-4.
            that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less,
            management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations,   15   H.R.  Rep.  No.  95-640,  at  4-5;  S.  Rep.  No.  95-
            and face higher, not lower, cost of capital.”).     114,  at  4.  The  Senate  Report  observed,  for  instance,  that
                                                                “[m]anagements  which  resort  to  corporate  bribery  and
            9      For  example,  in  a  number  of  recent  enforcement   the  falsification  of  records  to  enhance  their  business
            actions, the same employees who were directing or controlling   reveal a lack of confidence about themselves,” while citing
            the  bribe  payments  were  also  enriching  themselves  at  the   the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury’s  testimony  that  “‘[p]aying
            expense  of  the  company.  See,  e.g.,  Criminal  Information,   bribes—apart from being morally repugnant and illegal in
            United States v. Cyrus Allen Ahsani, et al., No. 19-cr-147 (S.D. Tex.   most countries—is simply not necessary for the successful
            Mar. 4, 2019), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter United States v. Ahsani]   conduct of business here or overseas.’” Id.
            (paying kickbacks to executives who were involved in bribe
            payments),  available  at  https://www.justice.gov/criminal-  16   See  S.  Rep.  No.  100-85,  at  46  (1987)  (recounting
            fraud/case/file/1266861/download;  Criminal  Information,   FCPA’s  historical  background  and  explaining  that  “a  strong
            United States v. Colin Steven, No. 17-cr-788 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,   antibribery statute could help U.S. corporations resist corrupt
            2017), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter United States v. Steven] (receiving   demands . . . .”) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 100-85].
            kickbacks  related to  certain corrupt  payments  made  by
            Embraer, S.A.), available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-  17   S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7.
            fraud/file/1021856/download;  Criminal  Information,  United
            States v. Robert Zubiate, No. 17-cr-591 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017),   18   Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act  of  1988,
            ECF  No.  1  [hereinafter  United States v. Zubiate]  (receiving   Pub. L. No. 100- 418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988);
            kickbacks related to certain corrupt payments made by SBM   see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 916-24 (1988) (discussing
            Offshore, N.V. in Brazil), available at https://www.justice.gov/  FCPA amendments, including changes to standard of liability
            criminal-fraud/file/1017281/download;  Complaint,  SEC  v.   for acts of third parties) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 100-576].
            Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 1, available
            at  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-  19   See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
            pr2012-78.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson,   §  5003(d).  The  amended  statute  included  the  following
            No. 12-cr-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter United   directive: “It is the sense of the Congress that the President
            States v. Peterson], available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/  should pursue the negotiation of an international agreement,
            default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/04/26/petersong-  among  the  members  of  the  Organization  of  Economic
            information.pdf;  Plea  Agreement,  United States  v. Stanley,     Cooperation  and  Development,  to  govern  persons  from
            No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 9 [hereinafter United   those  countries  concerning  acts  prohibited  with  respect  to
            States  v. Stanley],  available at  https://www.justice.gov/sites/  issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments made
            default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/03/19/09-03-  by this section. Such international agreement should include
            08stanley-plea-agree.pdf;  Plea  Agreement,  United States   a  process  by  which  problems  and  conflicts  associated
            v.  Sapsizian,  No.  06-cr-20797  (S.D.  Fla.  2007),  ECF  No.  42   with  such  acts  could  be  resolved.”  Id.;  see  also  S.  Rep.
            [hereinafter  United States v. Sapsizian],  available  at  https://  No.  105-277,  at  2  (1998)  (describing  efforts  by  Executive
            www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/  Branch to encourage U.S. trading partners to enact legislation
            legacy/2011/02/16/06-06-07sapsizian-plea.pdf.       similar to FCPA following 1988 amendments) [hereinafter S.
                                                                Rep. No. 105-277].
            10     See, e.g., Criminal Information, United States v. Société
            Générale S.A.,  No.  18-cr-253  (E.D.N.Y.  May  18,  2018),  ECF     20   Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
            No. 4 [hereinafter United States v. Société Générale], available   Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1.1, Dec.
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