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The Security Council could not act at all. On November 2, the Congo leaders made it clear to the Secretary General
the General Assembly then took up the matter. It called that the purpose of the request was to protect the Congo
for a cease fire. 41 None of the parties to the hostilities, from Belgian military intervention.
which now included England and France, carried out im-
mediately the terms of the General Assembly call for a The Secretary General requested an urgent meeting of
ceasefire. On November 4, the General Assembly, under the Security Council and presented to it the requests he
section A of its Uniting for Peace Resolution, called for a had received from the Congo Republic. No threat of veto
voluntary U.N. Force to restore peace and security in the stood in the way of any action the Security Council
area. 42 The General Assembly intended to call for an en- decided to order. The Security Council adopted two basic
tirely new force and not to utilize the Unified Command resolutions. The first on 14 July "called upon" the
which had been organized at the start of the Korean War Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the
and which was still in existence in Korea. England an- territory of the Congo and authorized the Secretary
nounced that she would welcome such a force if Egypt General:
agreed that such a force could enter her territory. 43 On To take the necessary steps, in consultation with the
November 7 all hostilities had ceased. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the
force which the General Assembly intended to send did Government with such military assistance, as may be
not have the mission of restoring peace, but of maintain- necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congo
ing it. Peace had already been restored. The force could be Government with the technical assistance of the United
small. Therefore, instead of working through a big power Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the
agent as was done in Korea, the General Assembly opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks. 48
authorized the Secretary General to gather such a force There was an interplay at the beginning between the pres-
entitled The United Nations Emergency Force. 44 The ence of Belgian troops and the breakdown of law and
General Assembly formed an Advisory Committee on 7 order. Belgum originally intervened because law and
November 1956 to assist the Secretary General. 45 The order had broken down. Therefore, in order to hasten the
Secretary General, after consulting with the Advisory withdrawal of Belgian troops, the Security Council
Committee, issued regulations for this United Nations authorized the Secretary General to use U.N. troops to
Emergency Force on 20 February 1957.46 These regula- assist the local authorities in restoring law and order.
tions defined the relationship between the Force and the The Secretary General, under authority of the Security
host state, the relationship between the contributing Council Resolution of July 14, 1960, proceeded to organ-
members and the Force, and the relationship between the ize a force based as far as possible upon his experience in
Force and the United Nations.
the Middle East. However, there was one basic difference.
The United Nations Emergency Force was more an In 1956 the United Nations Emergency Force was estab-
emergency police force, than it was an emergency military lished by the General Assembly as a subsidiary organ with
force. It could not compare in power to the Unified Com- a United Nations Commander appointed by the Assem-
mand in Korea. It did serve to help maintain the peace for bly, who has acted under the instructions and guidance of
eleven years. In 1967, the United Arab Republic re- the Secretary General. The force authorized for the Congo
quested the withdrawal of UN troops from its territory. was exclusively under the c~rnrnand of the Secretary
Secretary General U Thant ordered the withdrawal, and General as the agent of the Security Council.
the 1967 Middle East War followed.
On July 22, 1960, the Security Council passed a second
(c) The Congo. On 12 July 1960, the President
and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo ad- resolution which stated that the complete restoration of
dressed to the Secretary General a message requesting law and order in the Republic of the Congo would con-
military assistance becauseof the dispatch of troops from tribute to the maintenance of international peace and
Belgium to the Congo. 47 There was at the same time a security. 49 With the passage of this resolution, the rnis-
breakdown of internal order in the Congo. However, this sion of the U.N. in the Congo became twofold, (1) to
fact did not prompt the request for assistance. On July 13 hasten the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and (2) to
restore law and order. The requests of the Congo on July
12 and 13 only applied to the first. However, on July 29,
41. U.N. GAOR (1st Emg.Sp. Sess. Supp. No. 1, Res. 997) (ES-1)
(1956). 1960, the Government of the Republic of the Congo
42. Id. at Resolution 998 (ES-1). agreed with the Secretary General that it "will be guided,
43. Reply by the British Gov't to Mr. Harnmarskjold's cable of in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military
Nov. 4, 1956, Nov. 5, 1956. assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance
44. U.N. GAOR (1st Emg. Sp. Sess. Supp. No. 1, Res. 1000)
(ES-1) (1956).
45. Id. at Resolution 1'001 (ES-1). 48. U.N. Doc. S/4387, text of which is contained in 43 Dep't State
46. ST/Smetary-General's Bulletin, United Nations Emergency Bull. 161 (1 August 1960).
Force, No. 1, dated 20 February 1957. 49. U.N. Doc. S/4405, text of which is contained in 43 Dep't State
47. U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960). Bull. 223 (8 August 1960).