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Plate 1.5 Jade cup, 1420–49; Ottoman silver repair, 1600–1800, Samarqand. A Turkish inscription at the rim of this jade cup reads ‘Ulugh
Beg Kuragan’. Ulugh Beg, Shah Rukh’s son, was the ruler of Samarqand at the heart of the Silk Road from 1407 to 1447. Kuragan means
‘royal son-in-law’, a reference to Ulugh Beg’s family connection to Chinggis Khan, the great leader of the Mongols. Height 6.4cm, width
19.4cm. British Museum, London, purchased through the Brooke Sewell Permanent Fund, 1959,1120.1

Fierce and bold; he is the most treacherous among the Hu Mongol empire to win the support of Jurchen groups, the
caitiffs. The caitiff soldiers fear and respect him. Now he has Joseon throne, Eastern Mongols and polities in Central Asia,
already bowed his head at Our camp and demonstrated good arguing that he was the true heir to the mantle of Chinggis
faith. Believing that the Mandate of Heaven resides with Us, he and Qubilai. Each time Esen made such a claim, the Ming
does not dare to violate [Our will] and has respectfully led his court responded in direct and explicit terms, because it saw
followers to follow the Heavenly path. He has personally come that Chinggisid charisma retained appeal in Eurasia.
in submission to court where he has been received with
kindness. Furthermore, Ming emperors understood the need to
persuade multiple audiences that they, rather than their
慓悍勇猛，乃胡虜中之最狡黠者，虜兵畏服，今既稽首軍門，敷 Chinggisid contemporaries, were the rightful successors to
陳誠悃，以為天命在朕，不敢違越，敬率部落上順天道，親來朝 the Yuan dynasty. Finally, the Ming court believed that
見眷。 26
active engagement in Eurasia could persuade neighbours of
At the same time, the emperor was fully aware that he the legitimacy, even superiority, of Ming rulership.
needed to demonstrate his superior rulership and patronage
for broader audiences. He made a point of appointing Notes
Esen-Tughal and his nephew to senior military positions, My deepest thanks to Sarah Schneewind, Anne Gerritsen
giving them a real voice in strategic decisions such as the and Craig Clunas for their comments and suggestions on
target of the next major campaign, defending them against drafts of this chapter.
jealous Chinese officials and granting them privileged
economic and political status within the capital. 27 1 Robinson 2013b.
In the following decades, the Yongle emperor’s successors 2 Saeki 2009; Murai 2009; Ayalon 1951; Ayalon 1988; Amitai 1995;
Amitai 2008; Broadbridge 2008.
continued to justify their rulership through control of the 3 Dardess 1983; Farmer 1995; Jiang 2011.
story of the rise and irreversible fall of Chinggisid power and 4 Dreyer 1982; Okada 1999; Robinson 2008.
through displays of patronage intended to win the allegiance 5 Sharpe 2009 makes this point in reference to the Tudor monarchy.
of men from afar. During the 1440s and 1450s, the most 6 Robinson forthcoming.
7 Robinson 2014.
dangerous military and diplomatic challenge to face the 8 Veit 2009.
Ming court was the rise of a newly powerful Mongol polity 9 Post-Yuan Mongols sought to exploit Chinggisid charisma for their
under the ambitious Oirat leader Esen (r. 1438–53/4) and his own purposes. See Elverskog 2004; Elverskog 2006. For how one
Chinggisid ruler (Toqto’a-Buqa, r. 1433–52). Through Christian Turkic people revised the account of its origins in
military strikes, coercion and the strategic use of marriage response to shifting fortunes under the Chinggisids, see Atwood
2014.
alliances, Esen sought to extend his control over regions that 10 Ying zhi fu ping hu yue 應制賦平胡樂 in Zeng Qi 1995–7, ji 30, 158.
had formerly been within the Ming dynasty’s sphere of 11 Gao Deyang 1995–7, ji 29, 247.
interest. In addition, Esen invoked the legacy of the 12 Ping hu zhi bei 平胡之碑 in Hu Guang 1995–7, ji 28, 618.
28

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