Page 81 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

CHAPTER SIX

SPLM AND PARTY POLITICS

6.0 Introduction

In this chapter, we examine the prime aspects of state failure that have adversely affected the goal of state-

building and peace-building in South Sudan. Drawing on interviews with sections of local and international
stakeholders in South Sudan, we analyses the major areas of state reconstruction and peace-building that
the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) government has failed to address proactively, areas and
issues that seem directly or indirectly linked to the political crisis that started in December 2013 and the

relapse into armed conflict. Included in this chapter also is analyses the recent political developments and
ongoing peace process in South Sudan and proffers some complementary policy intervention measures that
could be implemented to strengthen the peace process.

On the other hand, we seek to do an analysis of SPLM government based on a number national

liberation movement’s legacy across Africa from 2005-2011. Melber had observed that national
liberation movements tend to fail as governments once in power but quite successful as liberation or
national liberation movements. The notable legacies that define the national liberation movements
among others include sense of legitimacy, factionalism, party dominance, unfamiliarity with

government, elitism and centralization and entitlement. This chapter will analyze the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and how it has addressed the social and national question
that triggered the civil war after capturing power through the comprehensive peace agreement in
2011.

6.1 Decolonisation and State Development

Oxymoronically described as a ‘pre-failed’ state, the current crisis in South Sudan emanates from the failure

of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) to transform into a democratic party, and
a state army respectively. Borne out of a post-independence political indulgence and inclination marked by
the absence of any credible and meaningful political and constitutional reform, it was not surprising that
the crisis in the SPLM erupted at the top echelon of political power. During the armed struggle, the glue

that kept the various divergent forces of the SPLM intact was their common enemy in Khartoum and their
aspiration for self-determination and independence. Once independence is achieved, unless transformed
into a democratic political force, it becomes only a matter of time before liberation movements face internal
divisions and even total rejection by their various supporters. Now, that glue is not strong enough to hold

all divergent views together, and the SPLM is no longer a liberation movement.

Unless liberation movements democratize and deliver on their independence they will increasingly face
popular protests that could develop into a crisis within the ruling party. It was a matter of time that the SPLM
leadership to face the mounting grievances of the population. Political instability has been accelerated

by rampant corruption that is symptomatic of the country’s weak legislative, regulatory and enforcement
mechanisms. Without military, legislative and other state institutions resistant to abuses and misuse by the
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