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through creation and preservation of jobs, social nourishment, and provision of affordable or free
          education, health and infrastructure. Like the liberation narrative elsewhere, South Sudan dream
          of liberation, better lives and peace dividends after liberation sacrifices came to nothing soon

          after political independence in 2011.

          The country was soon let down by international community and their local partners in SPLM.
          The  international  state  building  project that  was generously  funded  by the  USA and other
          development partners became typical rent seeking project whereas the national project associated

          with SPLM died before it was even born culminating to a double tragedy of international and
          national betrayal.

          The SPLM poor governance from the outset since its formation in 1983 with regards to how

          it  dealt  with  the Anyanya  (II)leadership. The  latter  were  killed  and  their  followers  forcefully
          coopted into SPLM while the rest joined Khartoum regime. The military orientation was planted
          from the inception instead of centrality of politics and diplomacy over militarism. Cabral argued
          that politics and not militarism or violence was a better liberating strategy.


                    “Militarism was one of SPLM ‘s weak point, that is according to me, When one kills your leader
                    and forces you to join them, you will not work in total submission and cooperation .This was the
                    case  of Anyanya II  followers. They were always on the lookout for any opportunity for them
                    to taint SPLM  from inside. The movement abandoned progressive politics and international
                    community gradually pulled out their support”.(O.I, Gai Tut Memoirs, Accessed 16 May 2017).


          The conflict ridden SPLM did not provide political education neither did it have political program
          of post conflict reconstruction even as it held conventions from 1994 and after. What is more,
          inter community conflicts and ethnic manipulation have taken heavy tool on the people of South

          Sudan. As a counter nationalist strategy, the Khartoum regime relied on divide and rule that
          would have been defeated through political education and better management of areas already
          liberated. In fact SPLM had very poor relations with the host communities due to excessive use
          of force and brutality.


          The widespread poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of resources   that remained largely
          unexploited suggests poor leadership that can at best be regarded as rent seeking and fits Cabral’s
          description of poor leadership. Basic needs such as shelter, hospitals, schools, roads and clean
          water remain a pipe dream to many. In fact massive insecurity, lack of institutions of governance

          and structures is part of a tradition of the movement that John Garang planted and encouraged in
          the formative years of the movement and sustained to his death in 2005.

          There are internal contradictions within the movement with regards to the objectives and

          fundamentals of liberation.  The clash between new Sudan and independent South Sudan is
          evidence of this. Many South Sudanese who preferred independence, as the referendum results
          would confirm, did not share Garang quest for new Sudan. Equally the meaning of liberation
          was assumed to be military defeat of the Khartoum regime without reference to post liberation
          reconstruction. Indeed,all confidential interviews concluded  that  SPLM  did not have a post

          conflict agenda and elite polarization was and remained due to lack of an ideology, political

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