Page 76 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

period shifted to political reconciliation, security sector reforms and major development plans
amid very fragile internal and external environment. The independence of South Sudan came
when the Arab spring was taking heavy toll on otherwise conservative Arab world.

The SPLM waged its war on grounds of economic exploitation, racial, religious and cultural
discrimination and political marginalization by the Arab North. The legacy of that marginalization

and economic situation at independence in 2011 was the political basis on which the achievement
or non-complishment of the SPLM would be judged especially the question of how to reverse
deeply entrenched poverty, lack of social development and complete absence of projecting

infrastructure in all fields of economic and political advancements in South Sudan. General Salva
Kiir remarked in 2005 that SPLM inherited no viable state structures, no physical infrastructure
and any dependable social service. The challenge of any liberation movement is measured against
the extent to which it addresses issues that led to the revolt and war in the first place.

Like the post-colonial state in the 1960s, the SPLM government confronted triple challenges of

poverty, ignorance and disease. With only 60km of road tarmacked only in Juba and over 90%
of the populace depending on subsistence agriculture in the rural areas and half of the population
dependent on food aid, the SPLM needed to make policy options that would carry along its
populace and win their hearts and minds after independence in 2011.

5.2.4 Political leadership and the curse of the SPLM

After the signing of the CPA and the subsequent referendum on 9th January 2011, followed by the
declaration of independence on 9th July 2011, it was clear that poverty and underdevelopment

was rampant and irreducible. Furthermore, the neoliberal model imposed by the donors and
international financial institutions and preferred by the elite was not promoting development.
The donor development projects during the transition period from 2005-2011 were riddled
with implantation. The older generation within the SPLM was reluctant or unwilling to cede

power to the new leadership or transform the movement into a modern political party that could
undertake fundamental political, social and economic transformation. Finally, corruption and
kleptocracy was deeply entrenched within the movement and government to warrant public and
donor outcry(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 44).

The SPLM failed to bring basic social services such as provision of schools, health services,

clean water, agriculture and energy. The failure to prioritize agriculture supposedly the engine of
growth made the general populace vulnerable and dependent on humanitarian relief food from the
international relief agencies. This was contradictory to the movement’s assurances and pledges
they made in 2004. The SPLM strategic framework for war to peace of 2004 that forms the SPLM’s

strategic vision on development programs for post war era had sound social programs that the
people wanted implemented including institutional infrastructure, transport, telecommunication,
town planning and rural electrification and development. Agriculture as pointed out earlier was
prioritized as the engine of growth. The SPLM abandoned all these programs and resorted to rent

seeking and looting of public resources. Insecurity and inter-ethnic conflicts increased together
with cattle rustling, murder, rape and genocide in some states. Political dissent was met with

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