Page 74 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

related with the masses. Secondly, he notes that for over 21 years of the civil war, the SPLM
lacked political organization and institutional power relations to the extent that the movement
unlike other liberation movements did not offer political education to the masses and soldiers.

Instead, the movement preferred militarism and militarized formations. The result was that there
was no solidarity and comradeship(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 43).

This policy promoted ethnicity and regionalization of internal SPLM relations. There was no
attempt to transform the movement into a political party governed by modern civic ethos hence
the SPLM remained a fighting machine instead of a national liberation movement. Predictably,

for ten years 2005-2015, Nyaba notes that the government has nothing to show in terms of social
economic development, physical infrastructure, and projects even after collecting revenue of
over 35 billion(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 44).

Revenue generated went to contracts awarded to friends and relatives of influential power barons
within the SPLM. The critics point out that rampant corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and

office and tribalism are rampant within SPLM government. It is therefore not by accident that in
2011, the United Nations Security Council placed South Sudan under chapter seven of the United
Nations charter as a condition for recognition as a sovereign state. The United Nations was and
has remained concerned about uncontrolled insecurity, open rebellions and ethnic conflicts that
has organically defined South Sudan political matrix(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 44).

Since its formation in 1983, the SPLM has been defined by leadership factionalism and movement
crises but most notable are the 1991 splintering and civil war that culminated with the formation
of Nasir faction. The 2004 Rumbek leadership crises, 2008-second convention leadership crises
and 2010 candidate’s nomination crises. In 2013, leadership crises lead to civil war and serious
political rifts within the movement that have persisted to date. Alex de Waal (2014) attributes

serial leadership crises to three interrelated factors. Firstly, the structural challenges of operating
with a revolutionary tradition of centralized authority and hierarchical command. This is a
legacy of war period when political military high command controlled political party, the military

and the administrative wing. As an inherited practice, it has continued to rule the institutional
functioning of the government and the party. Secondly, lack of institutionalization of the party
to the extent that party organs meet sporadically where individuals and key interests eclipse the
ability of the structure to operate alone.

Finally, divisions among its elites over vision and ideology created what some scholars refer to as
post John Gerang’s tiptoe, as new vision was never defined. Lauren Hutton on his part attributes

the persistence of the crises to a number of factors, some going back to the formation of SPLM.
He argues that there was no unity of purpose from the word goes. John Garang for example, was
in favor of New Sudan. It is of the essence to note that the original formation of SPLM resulted
into bloody conflict and internal divisions between the Anyanya (II) and SPLM. The problem

was power struggle and who was who within the movement. There was also the problem of
gross human rights abuses. The SPLM has aunderprivileged track record of accountability and
traditionally had poor relations with host communities in South Sudan. More often than not, it
had to rely on force or violence to get things done or compensate for ideological deficits.

There was real or perceived ethnic biases especially in favor of the Dinka ethnic group thus
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