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5.1 Why theSPLM negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

          We have noted the hegemonic influence of the USA in directing the Sudan peace process in the
          context of the global war against terrorism.  The previous chapter noted the fragile domestic
          environment for both Khartoum and the SPLM that limited the military solution to the Sudan

          civil war, whereas both parties did not prefer military solution. Hence, the stalemate together
          with the external environment conspired to deliver the CPAS(AD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 44).
          The SPLM was conflict ridden liberation movement, whose quest for power was riddled with
          internal contradictions and factionalism regarding the path and strategies of liberation.  The
          internal factionalism and emerging enhanced new world order prioritized negotiations and laid

          the basis for setting up of declaration of principles agreed by both, the Khartoum regime and
          the SPLM. The changing international environment convinced the Khartoum regime that it was
          in their long-term interest to make peace with the SPLM. The zero sum outcomes of the war,

          higher costs of the war, war in Darfur, the coup against Hassan Al Turabi and the pressure by
          the USA against Khartoum was too much to bear. On the other hand, SPLM wanted creation of
          New Sudan but faced serious internal rifts and legitimacy deficit hence a strong desire to achieve
          their political objectives through means other than war. The IGAD peace initiatives made major
          breakthroughs culminating with the signing of the Machakos Protocol on general principles of

          governance, self-determination, wealth and power sharing protocols signed in 2004.




          5.2 SPLM Challenges in 2005

          The SPLM took control of the the state marking the end of the war by signing the Comprehensive
          Peace  Agreement. By taking over the military and political control of the state, the SPLM
          presumed charge to the people of South Sudan in the context of sovereignty, accountability and
          good  governance.  Like any other  post-colonial state,  they had immense internal  and  external

          challenges to surmount. The immediate task was to impose the authority of the state from scratch,
          through  creation of state  institutions  of governance and decentralization  of power  across  the
          country(SAD.533/1/39).

                    “It was not easy to form stable government structures however; it had to be done. SPLM needed
                    to send a positive message to the south Sudanese population that there was hope even when there

                    was no civic structure in place” (OI, Christopher B. Lemi,  Juba, 21/03/2016) .

          As a liberation movement, the SPLM lacked civic structures of decision-making even in areas
          they controlled during the war. Internal challenges within the movement, especially after the
          split of 1991 and subsequent factionalism thereafter. Furthermore, the death of John Garang and
          exclusion of other armed groups and political forces from the peace processes in Naivasha added
          political tension. Underdevelopment, insecurity and lack of proprietorship of the peace process

          beyond the National Congress Party and the SPLM suggests that the Government of South Sudan
          was institutionally weak and vulnerable to both internal and external pressures at the initial
          stages of the state and nation building formations.

          The establishment of the state machinery and institutions began immediately after the signing of
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