Page 64 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

4.4.3 The SPLM leadership crises deepens

In the period 2005–2011, the three factions managed to check the centrifugal forces within the SPLM;
the peace process proved successful and cleared way for independence with fewer obstacles unlike the
predicted failure. The 2008 SPLM national convention revised the party manifesto and addressed some of
the long grievances but could not resolve the thorny leadership issue as it historically emerged. Like any
other political convention, positions were hotly contested but muted consensus was reached eliminating a

bitter political fallout soon after the convention. The party survived any many splits and emerged stronger
as a political force after a compromise was reached to increase party positions to include key political
actors. In support of this narrative, one respondent stated;

“For every south Sudanese resident to feel well represented, leadership shakeup in the movement

was inevitable. Key political figures had to be incorporated into leadership to prevent more party
divisions and to enhance unity and trust”(O.I, Michael Roberto Kenyi Legge, Juba, 26/03/2016).

But, again, prudence prevailed and a compromise with three deputies was agreed upon. In the past, better

fall out within the party saw prominent party leaders defect and form opposition parties to wrestle power
from the SPLM. For example, Lam Akol formed his own party before the elections. Afterwards, other
independent candidates who lost the election resorted to armed rebellion. At this point, SPLM chapters
in the rest of Sudan, notably Blue Nile and South Kordofan, observed with dismay the increasingly likely

prospect of South Sudan’s secession. Meanwhile, the Abyei faction within the SPLM was dissatisfied with
the lack of forcefulness in the attempt to ensure a referendum over Abyei’s future. Political elites in the three
Equatorial states were frustrated by their marginalization within the party. They also complained about what
they regarded as an invasion of their home turf, first and foremost Juba, by army and government leaders,

their extended families and networks of dependences and business associates(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-
42, 4). The ‘Dinka-dominance’ discourse yet again gained momentum and the question of moving the
capital further north was both debated and settled. Still, the Northern Sudanese SPLM, the Abyei groups
and the Equatorians remained peripheral and unable to challenge the SPLM leadership, at least as long as

the three main factions remained united. The 2008 convention could not settle all matters affecting the
movement and most of them were postponed or never deliberated at all thus laying basis for future political
confrontation.

Mamdani(2016), gives an account of the events before and during the 2013 crises observing that there was

power struggle and factionalism from within. At the extra ordinary convention Riek Machar presented a
proposal signed by some members of the politburo led by the secretary general Pagan Amum and supported
by Deng Alol and Rebecca Garang, the wife of John Garang and founder of SPLM. They had called a press
conference on 6 December 2013 and presented their proposal that they would table at the extra ordinary
th
convention of SPLM scheduled for 14 December 2013. They proposed amendment on the party manifesto
and the constitution. In particular, they called for the democratization of the party and reduction of powers
of the chairperson of the ruling party. They called for election of all party positions. The proposal was
rejected by the majority in support of Salva Kiir and suggested amendments thrown out on 14 December,

2013(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 00). The Riek and his supporters did not attend the conference on 15
December, 2013 but the conference proceeded in their absence. The status quo was upheld as the convention
58