Page 59 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

parallel SPLM structures accountable only to himself. In addition, John Garang was blamed for creating
factionalism and lies for self-preservation. For example, he was accused of eliminating those who honestly
differed with him in leadership. Last but not least, he was accused of privileging brute force over intellect

and persuasion in the struggle against Khartoum regime. Finally, SPLM leadership similarly was accused
of lacking concern for the welfare of the liberators. Failure to address issues of concern to Sudan and the
SPLM historically predicated a sustained leadership crisis that has persisted to date (Rowlandson, 2005;
Washburn, 2010).

When South Sudan acquired political independence in 2011, it was the last among liberation movements
that captured state power in Africa. Since the mid-1980s and early 1990s, liberation movements have
seized power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Their
success is typically assessed on the basis of their ability to implement their more or less revolutionary

political programs, crafted during the armed struggle or in the bush. Many liberation movements in Africa
aspire to create a revolutionary state that is not only developmental but stable and pro people it seeks to
liberate. Political stability, even when pursued through violent and oppressive means remains the most
preferred criteria under which legitimacy and development is socially judged. The outbreak of civil war

in December 2013 has therefore raised the question of the viability and sustainability of an independent
South Sudan and intensified the debate over Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s (SPLM) capacity,
preparedness, willingness and suitability to govern. In other words, it raises fundamental question on the
SPLMs ability to address both the social and national question that is primary to any liberation movement

in Africa(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

Accounts of what happened in Juba on December 15, 2013 have been given by African Union commission
of inquiry into South Sudan conflict and the dissenting opinion by Mamdani on the same. The latter has
concluded that the violence narrative was political and not criminal. He gave a full account of the violence,

the context as well as the discussion of the issues that triggered the same. Equally the conflict has been
explained and analyzed as ethnic in a thesis advanced by Alex De Waal, and international crises group
(2014). The same argument is advanced by Robert Gerenge in his occasional paper written for accord

(2016).

The accounts are similar as triggers. In their narrative, hostilities broke out in Juba on 15 December 2013
and soon spread to other parts of the city and country targeting opposition leaders and their supporters.
Widespread violence ensued forcing Riek Machar to escape outside the country. According to reports,

hundreds of civilians were killed, and thousands fled to UN compounds for protection. The government
accused the opposition of planning a coup, an allegation denied by the opposition. What is more, the
opposition alleged that president Salva Kiir had recruited and armed a youth militia in Juba and used the
war as a pretext to get rid of his political opponents within the SPLM according to African Union findings
and Mamdani dissenting view of the report.

As the war intensified in the following months, the state capitals in Greater Upper Nile, Bentiu, Malakal
and Bor changed hands several times members of this faction pursue their goals solely through political and
diplomatic means. The rebels controlled parts of the country as attempts to end the war intensified. The full

account of what transpired has been noted and does not warrant a repeat of the same in this research. Other
than to add that a more credible account has been given by Douglas Johnson (2014), arguing the problem

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