Page 58 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

not have a political program or ideology of winning the heart and the minds of the people. Many
people in South Sudan were reluctant to join the movement while the movement committed many
civilian atrocities as a fighting force losing at the legitimacy front.

There were so many serious political and security challenges that confronted the SPLM. The
second phase (1991-1996) was one of reflection and reconciliation. There was major break of
the movement following Khartoum’s war strategy weakening the SPLM by creating factionalism
from within and use of pastoral proxies against the SPLM. The result was a major split pitting

the SPLM mainstream against Nassir faction of.Riek Machar, Lam Akol and others that formed
the Southern Sudan Defense Forces. The Nasir factionalism committed some of the most serious
crimes against humanity in the history of the movement (Nyaba, 2003).

We noted the first national conference of SPLM in 1994 at Chukdum in Equatorial and its
inconclusive manner. Critics dismissed the National Convention Resolutions as choreographed
and a public gimmick. On the other hand supporters of the convention argued that the resolutions
such as the separation of the movement’s military and political wings were historical. The
National Convention none the less had notable shortcomings including inability to deal with

internal party cohesion and reconciliation. SAD.887/9/13

In the absence of such, one would argue that the National Convention failed to resolve the
historical grievances within the SPLM. The second phase was largely about creating unity and
reconciliation within the movement after the 1991 split and ultimate consequences of the same.

Although in general a major fall out was avoided, the problems were postponed and would later
form the basis for future confrontation.

The final Phase (1997-2005) can be regarded as a period of renaissance and adaptation to reforms

from within the movement aimed at securing legitimacy. The vision of the movement remained
elusive. Whereas John Garang assumed that SPLM was pursuing a national project, the bulk
of the movement wanted secession and independence. According to Hippler (2005), Nationalist
projects in Africa have five objectives: (a) to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity,

(b) constructing collective identity, (c) building a competitive national economy, (d) promoting
social integration, and (e) consolidating state power and legitimacy. Furthermore, it was assumed
that SPLM would address issues such as poverty, ignorance and disease. National conventions
were called in 1994, 2004, 2008 and 2013 and all of them sought to address leadership crises

and factionalism that had come to define SPLM since its formation in 1983. None was called
to deal with policy matters or to search for answers on the fundamental issues confronting New
Sudan and South Sudan. Power struggle and factionalism despite attempts at reconciliation have
come to be part of the movement’s political and military culture culminating with the civil war

in December 2013 and 2016 cease-fire(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

The Rumbek emergency meeting of 2004 was the most revealing. It was called to conduct honest assessment
of the SPLM a month before the signing of CPA on 9th January 2005 and at the same time secure between
John Garang with his chief of Staff, General Salva Kiir Mayardit. In particular, the movement was highly

critical of John Garang whom it accused of abusing his powers and personalizing control of the movement
and its resources to ensure personal control of the movement. Furthermore, he was accused of creating
52