Page 57 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

General Arok Thon Arok, and. Riek Machar. Tribal militias were led by General Paulino Matip,
Peter Gadet of the Unity state, and Gordon Kong of the Upper Nile, Clement Wani Igga of
Equatorial, Tom Al Nur of Western Bahr El Ghazal, Gabriel Tang Ginya and Sultan Abdel Baggi

Ayii of the upper Nile. Meanwhile, Lam Akol signed his own agreement with Khartoum in
September 1997 in Fashoda. Peter Gadet and Paulino Matip were responsible in controlling oil
fields in Unity and Bentiu states. The Khartoum strategy of weakening the SPLM from within
and using militias to weaken the South worked to the extent that it managed to secure the oil

producing states of Upper Nile and Unity States. Furthermore, SPLM positions in Eastern
Equatorial were weakened. The Khartoum regime was engaged in public relations of portraying
itself as advancing peace in South Sudan. Although the Khartoum strategy worked, fresh conflicts
between Khartoum allies in the south jeopardized the gains already made as allies turned against

one another(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

The SPLM registered significant military gains from 1995 securing Equatorial region and key
infrastructure. The following two years saw the resurgence SPLM secure Western Equatorial,
Western Bahr Al Ghazal, Lakes and Warrap states under General Salva Kiir Mayardit and

reclaimed. Internal SPLM reconciliation brought on board Riek Machar andLam Akolwho
rejoined the movement in 2002 and 2004 respectively. The SPLM regained the territories it had
lost in the previous ten years. The war was a stalemate and each party was seeking a negotiated
settlement.

The SPLM we noted, started as a fighting outfit with the support of Mengistu Haile Mariam and fought
militarily to secure territories. It lacked a political program for the liberated areas neither did it offer political
education among its cadres. The focus was more on securing territories and weakening the Khartoum
regime. There was no focus on how to manage diversity and form national identity worth reducing the levels

of suspicions created by the Khartoum regimes and ethnicity based political rivalry and brinkmanship.

Furthermore, it lacked projects of promoting citizenship over ethnic sub nationalism. Mamdani
(1998)has rightly observed that the external factors forced the Khartoum regime to rethink the
idea of granting independence for self-preservation especially in the context of the American led

war against terrorism. Fearing regime change in Khartoum, the National Congress Party thought
the best way of remaining in power is to secure better relations with the west and remain in
power was to grant the independence to South Sudan hence South Sudan was a child of USA led

war against terrorism. Whatever the motivation, the Khartoum regime failed to defeat the SPLM
at the beginning of the millennium whereas SPLM could not liberate itself militarily from the
Khartoum regime(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

The SPLM since its inception in 1983 underwent three major phases of evolution and each phase

had unique challenges to deal with and ended with diverse outcomes. The period 1983-1991 was
the most defining for SPLM. The movement as we have pointed out registered significant gains
in the battlefield and embraced Marxist rhetoric. The movement was trying to find its feet and
ensure internal coherence while overcoming the shortcomings that defined Anyanya (I). John

Garang had identified three key challenges to be overcome in order for SPLM to be a formidable
military force-factionalism, lack of unity and power struggle among Anyanya. The movement did

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