Page 54 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

a fatal move for SPLM.At this instance, the movement had Anyanya sympathisers who fueled
disunity and mistrust in the movement even more”(O.I, Gideon Samuel, Juba, 27/03/2017).

The first ten years of the movement registered significant military victories and successes, as

SPLM underwent a transition from a guerilla army into a professional military force. To be sure,
the military expanded seized more territory including Juba in 1992. John Garang emerged as
the undisputed leader of the movement and rallied the northern traditional parties behind him
including the communist party, and African Muslims in Darfur, South Kordofan, South Blue Nile,

eastern Sudan, Khartoum and the Nubians(SAD.887/9/15). What is more, SPLM/A evicted forces
of Khartoum and in the process sabotaged the oil fields in both exploration and production.

SPLM/A acquired the support of Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia and as a result

intensified peasant military conscription leading to great military victories and territorial
acquisition including Equatorial. According to Le Richie and insiders within the movement, the
SPLM/A was already a conventional military force by 1989 with over 70,000 troops occupying
garrison towns such as Juba, Wau and Malakal. It also registered military victories in South
Kordofan, Darfur and parts of Blue Nile. In upper Nile, SPLM targeted key government

infrastructure such as Jonglei canal and oil exploration sites. Furthermore, they detained French
engineers and international workers in Bentiu town. This led to total cancellation of the canal
construction in 1983 while oil development exploration came to an abrupt end along the Upper

Nile(SAD.887/9/15).

Meanwhile, economic crises in Khartoum was making war expensive to undertake while corruption
and massive borrowing both internally and externally was creating dissent within the military in
Khartoum with the result that General Numeiri was overthrown on 5th April 1985. Before the

coup against him, Numeiri had a war strategy of using divide and rule by depicting war as tribal.
Secondly, he was keen on protecting the oil fields infrastructure in the upper Nile. The SPLM
did not take part in post Numeiri transition. It was busy reorganizing and recruiting new soldiers
within its ranks. In support of this narrative, one respondent stated that

“General Numeiri’s fall was a sigh of relief for us, we were not in agreement with his approach,
he was more interested in affairs not affecting the southern Sudan. With this in our mind, we
had to embark on a serious reorganization of our army for formidable force to put forward our
agenda”(O.I, Gideon Samuel, Juba, 27/03/2017).

The Mahdi regime adopted the Islamic policies, sharia laws and war strategies as planned by
Numeiri. Sadiq backed the Arabs militias created organized by Numeiri regime of war by proxy
against Southern Sudan, Darfur, South Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains. The aim was to
reduce the capacity ofSPLM as the leader of the revolutionary New Sudan that SPLM/A wanted

to establish. While the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Dr. Hassan Al Turabi was in full support
of these policies, the SPLM on the other hand, counteracted the war in proxy by looting and
mistreating the communities it considered hostile or collaborating with the enemy. As a result of
proxy wars, the SPLM was engaging multiple militias among them Mundari, Toposa, murle and

Lotuho. The turning point was the launch of the Bright Star Campaign in 1988. The campaign
sought to secure towns and areas hitherto under the Khartoum regime in the south including Juba
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