Page 62 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

have held key ministry posts both in Khartoum and in Juba and – although Kiir has been the chairman and
controlled important parts of the army and the government apparatus Greater Bahr el-Ghazal and Salva
Kiir’s presidency and draws support from Equatorial and has the elite backing of Vice-President James

Wani Igga, Clement Wani Konga, James Hoth Mai, Bona Malwal and Telar Ring. Other notables include
Kuol Manyang Juuk and Nhial Deng Nhial. The president also has a strong position within the SPLM and
has used legal and extra-legal powers to amass power and influence within the movement (MLCS 83/7692
(J) FT MEADE).

A significant number of soldiers in the government army hail from the Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap state, his
home town. More importantly, Salva Kiir was Garang’s right hand man during the war and the real power
behind the throne who dealt with day to day running of the military and governance. Even when Garang
was alive, Salva Kiir was the most influential of the Bahr el-Ghazal group and seen as their spokesperson

and representative in the SPLM leadership. He was viewed as the authentic voice of those who advocated
for the independence of South Sudan unlike Garang who fought for the new Sudan whose legitimacy was
doubtful. The third main faction is led by Riek Machar Teny, Taban Deng and Peter Gadet, the latter a
capable, but unpredictable Warlord. Its main bases of support are in Greater Upper Nile and its military

power lays in the plethora of militia groups that fought against the SPLM during the last war. Johnson
(2016) observes that from around 2000, many of the Nuer factions were re-integrated into the SPLM;
important landmarks were Riek Machar’s return to the SPLM fold in January 2002 and the signing of the
Juba declaration in 2006 which brought into the fold, among others, the late Paulino Matiep, a powerful

militia leader in Unity state.

The integration of renegade generals into the SPLM fold did not address the underlying and historical
problems confronting the SPLM. Rather, their accommodation created insecurity among the militias in
rural areas as confusion and politics of reintegration took the center stage. Indeed, this process only enlarged

the military in terms of numbers while increasing public wage bill in the defense budget that was already
inflated and unsustainable.

When Garang died in July 2005, the SPLM was coming to terms with the dynamics of signing the peace
agreement and ways of reconfiguring the movement into new political machine and transforming the SPLM

into a new Defense Force. The death came at a time when SPLM was factionalized and in search of its
own survival and renewal. His death thoroughly changed the internal dynamics of the SPLM’s factionalized
politics, but in an act of unusual self-restraint and collective statesmanship, the SPLM leadership postponed

the struggle over the control of the party and appointed Salva Kiir as the new chairperson(MLCS 83/7692
(J) FT MEADE). The appointment of Salva Kiir as the SPLM leader was by consensus but the one that
marginalized the Garang group of loyalists. In 2004, Salva Kiir and the Bahr el-Ghazal faction saw themselves
as sidelined vis-à-vis the other internal SPLM factions. This led serious power struggle between Salva Kiir
and Garang himself and their differences were only temporarily resolved through a reconciliation meeting

called by elders. At the time of his death, the relations between Garang and Salva Kiir were far from cordial.

Factionalism and wrangles have been a hall mark of Kiirs presidency. To his critics, he remains power hungry
and vision less. Evidently, he has presided over a very corrupt neo colonial regime not worth liberation

sacrifices. The SPLM had always struggled to address issues such as ubiquitous corruption, governance,
internal party democracy, ethnicity, merit, nepotism and autocratic leadership. The control of the party and

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