Page 65 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

was concluded. The rebellion or violence started on 15 December 2013 and a full account is provided in the
African Union report on the same in 2015.

The fresh civil started in the evening of December, 15, 2013 and spread across the country. The violence

assumed ethnic dimensions of Nuer versus Dinka. According to Mamdani, the violence had three political
objectives. Firstly, it sought to cleanse Juba of Nuer population perceived to be sympathetic to the opposition
leader, Riek Machar. Secondly, it sought to divide the population along ethnic lines. Finally, the aim was
also to prevent any consensus from within the party. In his conclusion therefore, he observes that the

violence was political. We have noted similar conflicts in the past in 1983 and 1991 respectively over
conflicting visions of independent Sudan and new Sudan promoted by Garang.

The war had heavy civilian casualties as it spread to residential areas in Juba and few days later spread to

Bentiu, Bor and Malakal. There were killings and revenge killings including destruction of property. The
war had serious political and economic ramifications. It led to the complete breakdown of relations between
the Dinka, the Nuer, the Shilluk and Equatorians. The war was interpreted as ethnic by ordinary people who
in turn sought refuge as internally displaced persons in Juba and other affected areas. Insecurity increased
especially prevalence of banditry, robbery, murder and rape in the context of the 2013 fresh violence. The

state lost control of larger parts of the country as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
got overwhelmed by high humanitarian crises. International contractors and western development partners
abandoned projects due to insecurity and left the country in a hurry. The local economy collapsed as informal

economy thrived across the country(SAD.533/5/23-25; 533/5/40-42, 4).

The war highlighted the internal fault lines within the movement and the limitations of SPLM as a liberation
movement. The war came about as a result of power struggle within SPLM political leadership. The latter
failed to contain political crises that soon spread into the military polarizing it along ethnic lines. It took

the intervention of Uganda to restore calm in Juba and Bor as IGAD block intervened to end the violence
and mediate the conflict leading to the signing of first agreement on resolution of conflict in the republic of
South Sudan on 17 August 2015. The agreement started the implementation and restored Riek Machar into
his former position as the vice president in April 2016. On the 8 July 2016, there was disagreement at the
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presidential palace that brought presidential guard and Machar clashing inside and outside Juba One palace

with the result that Riek Machar left the country marking the end of the peace agreement. The IGAD with
the support of troika(USA, Norway and UK), African Union(AU), United Nations Security Council(UNSC)
and effectively in December 2016 called on all parties in the conflict to attend the IGAD meeting to agree

on a new frame work of negotiations. This led to high level revitalization forum and ultimate signing of the
reinvigorated peace agreement. In June 2017, the process started and agreement reached with the signing of
the revitalized agreement on resolution of conflicts in the republic of South Sudan(R-ARCSS) in September
2018 in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.

The evolution of SPLM/A since 1983 until it captured state power in 2005 and formal independence in 2011
suggests that nine fundamental have not been adequately addressed rather postponed over time leading
to fresh conflicts and war. Corruption, internal party democracy, economy, justice, reconciliation, power
struggle within SPLM, security sector reforms, constitution and state/nation building remain central in the

search for peace and order in South Sudan. The narratives of fresh violence since 2013 and peace agreement
on the same have similar triggers and themes that have come to define SPLM political and military culture.

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