Page 63 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

the military has created inter elite power struggle and factionalism within. The power struggle has seen
increased corruption and abuse of power and impunity. Insecurity has increased as political conflicts move
from bad to worse even after independence in 2011. The control of SPLM and its resources became a high

voltage power game. To those seeking to capture state power and the presidency in particular, the control of
the party machinery was the way to that direction and required direct challenge to kiir leadership. When the
fresh civil war therefore emerged, the primary expression was power struggle within the party that turned
chaotic and violent. That suggests that one could not challenge the president from within and without. The

control of would join opposition parties in the context of a multiparty system. The party was a zero sum
game since the vanquished would be driven into the political wilderness without a soft landing or access to
power(SAD.887/9/3-4).

SPLM is thoroughly intermeshed with the state. Salva Kiir is chairman of the SPLM as well as commander-

in-chief for the SPLM. Within the neopatrimonial state, it is difficult to distinguish between the office of
the president, the party leadership and the army. The party leadership is well resourced and could marshall
party machinery and wealth to win an election considered a formality as there is no possibility of a new
opposition party winning in a substantially free and fair elections. They may also use the resources of the

state to block opposition parties. In contrast, there is no established system or tradition for opposition parties
in South Sudan to mobilize financial support from their members or sympathizers. The political parties in
the opposition are aware of the challenges of being in the opposition without access to state resources and
largesse to attract and retain political loyalty. More often than not, opposition parties have always boycotted

elections on grounds that the ruling party would marshal state resources to their detriment.

The SPLM organized two national conventions over the last thirty years notably in 1994 and 2008
respectively. Before the new war broke out, the SPLM was scheduled to have a national convention. The
national liberation council is the body mandated to organize such a convention and set the agenda for the

convention. The process of preparing the convention is rather elaborate and cumbersome. The National
Liberation Council works with the politburo that is composed of 50 members that meet as necessary to deal
with the day to day matters of the party as far as policy formulation is concerned. The preparation process

for the national convention is comprehensive and painstakingly slow: it starts from the lowest of the five
government levels and continues through to state level(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

Dates were announced for the national convention and for the preparatory meetings in the Political Bureau
and the NLC, but each time the meetings were postponed. Meanwhile, South Sudan was brought to a

political standstill. When the leadership crisis deepened in 2013, it was evident that the national convention
and, in consequence, the planned 2015 national elections would be significantly delayed. There is no formal
or constitutional link between the SPLM’s national convention and national elections in South Sudan,
but is unlikely that elections will be held before the SPLM decides upon a presidential candidate. The
crises within the party are unlikely to be resolved until the peace process is back in track and a legitimate

transitional government is in place to allow the party room and time for leadership reflection and elections.

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