Page 60 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

has much to do with split within the SPLM and such splits are part of the movement’s culture since its
foundation in 1983.

The responsibility and task of ending the war fell on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

(IGAD)-facilitated negotiations in Addis Ababa and Arusha respectively. There were other diplomatic
efforts by Thabo Mbeki that sought to unite SPLM factions into single entity but registered no success. His
focus was on internal party reconciliation.

The problems within the SPLM are historical and cannot be explained adequately within a single variable.

The ongoing crises are a combination of neo patrimonial politics, war legacy, political culture, and failure
to transform the SPLM from a liberation movement to a political party that is defined by civic culture and
political programs to be achieved through persuasion and tact. The SPLM failed to allow free contestation

of power from within and intra party democracy triggering serious political rifts that triggered the 2013
civil war. A combination of a weak patrimonial state, a wartime mentality and lack of peaceful mechanisms
for political contestation and transition that brought about the current war perhaps can significantly explain
the ongoing crises. It is through an examination of structural causes of the conflict, the background for the
internal problems within the SPLM since the 1980s, and the dynamics by which internal tensions within

the SPLM came about. Mamdani(2016),argues that the civil war was political and not criminal or ethnic as
presented in sections of the international and local media.

4.4.1 The structural causes of the war in South Sudan

Comprehensive peace agreement in 2005 brought in place state institutions and practices acquired during
the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899–1956) administration. During the Second Civil War (1983–2005)
two systems of governance existed in harmony since SPLM controlled largely rural areas as the Khartoum

regime controlled garrison towns. In the following years of transition (2005–2011), the government of
South Sudan lead by SPLM was overwhelmed and failed to stamp in authority across the country. The
government lacked a single system of governance. In fact it never spread it government machinery across
the country. The void in governance allowed personal rule to prevail and strong military rulers emerged

within the SPLM to challenge its legitimacy and power in rural areas of the diverse southern states(MLCS
83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

These are groups challenged the SPLM legitimacy and entrenched the rise of strong military leaders. The
ongoing war has taken the familiar trends that historically have seen factionalism and change of allegiance

at the slightest pretext possible. In giving the recent account of the war, Mamdani(2016) ,notes that the war
had all the hall marks of intra SPLM conflicts since inception in 1983 but most importantly the Nasir split
of 1991.

South Sudan’s fresh war invited the front states to intervene to protect their interests in the country and in

the process undermined the legitimacy of the leadership of both sides the political divide. The Mengistu
regime supported SPLM in 1983 and sustained its support until the end of the cold war before Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda emerged as the key ally and supporter of the movement. When the new war broke out

in December 2013, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) moved quickly to save the face of the
president who was on the verge of defeat. The government faction thus appears weak and propped up by
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