Page 61 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

Uganda. Looking at the manner of intervention, Kiir emerged as a Uganda protectorate president.

On the other hand, the SPLM in Opposition suffered serious military and political back lash. Indeed, without
the support from Khartoum and elsewhere, there is little chance of assembling the red army and defending

the upper Nile even though there is no evidence to show that the opposition enjoyed foreign support. The
foreign intervention ha the following ramification. Salva Kiir would provide arms to rebels in Darfur, South
Kordofan and Blue Nile in the event Khartoum supported Riek Machar and hence make peace process more
complex and expensive. The rebel support by Khartoum would led to the same extended to the armed in

Border States thereby destabilizing the region through surrogate war(SAD.887/9/13)

The weakness of the state is also reflected in the political system in South Sudan that concentrates more
power on the executive. The other arms of the state have been irrelevant with the exception of parliament

that occasionally demonstrates some relative independence. The security agencies and other institutions of
governance have equally remained very weak or nonexistent. The post independent South Sudan therefore
exhibits primary features of both a failed transition and failed state. The inherited state was incapable of
carrying out basic tasks of governance.

4.4.2 Factionalism and politics of cutting the pie

We need to consider previous developments to explain how and why the crisis within the SPLM leadership
came about in 2013. Some of the ideological splits and personal animosities originate in events and processes

which can be traced back to before the beginning of the previous civil war. The first generation rebels were
largely composed of students, ‘intellectuals’ and former guerrilla soldiers from Greater Upper Nile and
Greater Bahr el-Ghazal that formed the social base of Anyanya. They had a single agenda of fighting for
the independence of South Sudan but not new Sudan as advocated by Garang.

Subsequently, the three main factions of the SPLM consisted of Dinka Rek, Malwal and Twic. The center of
liberation or fulcrum of the struggle is based among this group and would rightly lay claim to the liberation
struggle and political leadership. The SPLM-aligned elites from these areas were symbolically important.

During the last civil war (1983-2004), the faction centered on the eastern bank of the Nile was the strongest,

and John Garang was its undisputed leader. Garang established elaborate personal rule and social base
in Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei. The faction sustained the war and paid heavy cost of the war
as compared to other regions. It equally formed the nucleur of the struggle especially Deng Alor, Pagan

Amum, Majak d’Agoot, Oyai Deng and Nhial Deng Nhial. Garang. But Garang also forged alliances with
commanders who had more independent bases of power. Garang however remained suspicious of structures
of accountability or governance until he died in 2005.

Since July 2005, TwicDinka have been marginalized within the movement. They had carried the hopes,

fears and aspirations of new Sudan before Kiir came to power. This faction was loosely knit in the first place
and has been disintegrating ever since Salva Kiir came to power. Rather it was rooted in their individual
capacities as SPLM party cadres and their former proximity to Garang. The elites closer to Garang carried
the dream of new Sudan that was hardly shared by the majority of South Sudanese as demonstrated by

the outcome of the referendum for independence. Since 2005, the leaders of the former Garang faction

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