Page 8 - FSUOGM Week 46 2022

FSUOGM COMMENTARY FSUOGM

accumulated in the period 1994-2016. join the protests.
According to the contract signed by the cur- In addition, there are opposition parties
rent Moldovan government in October 2021, inside and outside Parliament (at least eight
the debt situation was supposed to be resolved entities) that oppose the war (not Russian mili-
in the spring of 2022 and involved an interna- tary aggression against Ukraine) and mobilise to
tional audit to verify the authenticity of the debt. exert political pressure on the government.
Although it clarified the payment of the debt at In this fragile political context, the scope of
the end of October to the maintenance of the mutual blackmail increases in which the Chis-
contract, Gazprom confirmed gas deliveries for inau government exponents warn that it will
the month of November. However, Russia can reduce the volume of gas to the Transnistria
decide at any time to break the contract that the region if it does not supply more electricity. For
Moldovan authorities consider advantageous. its part, the Tiraspol administration suggests
Due to the price formula, the current contract direct negotiations with Moscow and refuses to
with Gazprom offers a price some $400 lower co-ordinate energy consumption with Chisinau.
than the European market ($821.5 compared At the same time, the breakaway region demands
with €1,200 per 1,000 cubic metres). more gas, which it cannot provide for reasons of
One factor that may cause Russia to abandon security and scarcity, especially if Moldova is
the contract may be the result of the audit carried going to buy it at market prices.
out by the companies Wikborg Rein Advokat- Moldova's energy security is under geopolit-
firma AS (Norway) and Forensic Risk Alliance & ical (weaponisation of energy levers), financial
Co. (UK), which are due to present their results (accessibility of prices for natural gas and elec-
only in January 2023 (around eight months after tricity from non-Russian sources) and security
the period originally agreed with Gazprom). pressure with respect to critical national infra-
Last but not least, in addition to the reduc- structure. This last aspect becomes imperative,
tion in the volume of gas and the effect on elec- given the recent incidents caused by Russian air
tricity supply, but also the risks arising from the strikes against Ukraine, which after Ukrainian
non-resolution of the historical debt, another missile defences attacked Moldovan territory,
dimension of the ramified energy crisis consists causing an incident in Naslavcea.
of the disputes between the government in Chis-
inau and the Tiraspol administration. In lieu of conclusions…
Moldova needs about 120 mcm of gas for Given the enormous threats that the military
the month of November. Of this total, some 41 failures in Ukraine pose to the political regime
mcm may be replaced by fuel oil for the produc- in Moscow, the winter of 2022-2023 represents a
tion of thermal energy, another 54 mcm will be strategic moment for Russia, in which its energy
imported under the contract with Gazprom, and tools could be used to their full potential to
the state company Energocom from other mar- apply additional socio-economic and political
kets will purchase the remaining 23 mcm. In this pressure on the national governments of the EU
regard, a contract was recently signed with the countries.
Bulgarian transmission network operator (Bul- In parallel, Russian attacks on Ukraine's
gartransgaz). Furthermore, Moldova has about energy infrastructure continue, representing a
90 mcm of natural gas in the form of strategic new facet of the "war of attrition". Thus Russia
reserves, enough for about two weeks in case has revealed its intention to force peace nego-
Russia cuts off deliveries. tiations, which would be an indirect form of
The authorities want to stop the increase in Ukraine's capitulation to Russian aggression.
energy prices, which is inevitable if electricity in The aggression against Ukraine also indi-
the Transnistria region is not supplied at full vol- rectly targets Moldova, which thus becomes a
ume. Otherwise, the anti-government protests collateral victim. In addition, Russia is taking
orchestrated so far by the Shor Party may expand advantage of the energy sector to put pressure
and gain legitimacy among a larger number of on the Moldovan authorities, which face seri-
citizens, who have so far avoided them for cred- ous dilemmas due to their double dependence
ibility reasons. Under recently introduced US on Russian gas and electricity supplied by the
sanctions, Ilan Şor and his party are qualifiable breakaway region.
as Russian agents (OFAC, October 2022). Denis Cenusa is a political scientist,
In addition to this, other kleptocratic groups, researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences
controlled by the fugitive oligarch Vladimir Pla- at Liebig-Justus University in Giessen, Ger-
hotniuc, also sanctioned by the US, who prom- many. This comment first appeared on IPN
ised to return to Moldovan politics, could also here. ™

P8 www. NEWSBASE .com Week 46 19•November•2022