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 bne July 2020 Eurasia I 57
China and Russia blur lines on “division of labour” in exerting influence over Central Asia
Kanat Shaku in Almaty
China’s growing influence over Central Asian economics, politics and security at the expense of Russia – a topic that is revisited repeat- edly given its essential strategic import – continues to grab the attention of the region’s geopolitical observers. One
of the most recent iterations of this focus came in the form of a report by
a Washington-based think tank, the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute.
The report’s author, Bradley Jardine, indicated to RFE/RL in a recent inter- view that the traditional “division of labour” between China and Russia
– where Russia takes care of security matters and China focuses on economic influence – is fading. The report itself indicates this process is under way in its citation of Chinese military equipment sales to the region. They have come to account for 18% of military hardware
in Central Asia in the past five years as opposed to the mere 1.5% in 2010-2014. Despite Russia’s continued military dominance in the region, the report sees the development as significant.
“In September 2018, Kazakhstan bought eight Chinese Y-8 transport airplanes, modelled on the Russian Antonov An-12. This activity has also led to a diminishing lead for Russia in the sup- ply of advanced weapons systems,” the report reads. “For example, Turkmeni- stan purchased a QW-2 Vanguard 2 por- table surface-to-air missile, modelled on Russia’s 9K38 Igla 2018, from the Chinese military technology company CATIC. In November 2019, Uzbekistan’s Air Defense Force successfully tested China’s FD-2000 medium-range air- defense system on a target drone. The China Ordnance Industry Group Cor- poration Limited donated VP11 patrol vehicles to Tajikistan in 2018.”
China is also seen as dominating in areas where Russian technology continues
to lag, including with reference to the CH-3, CH-4, CH-5 and the Wing Loong armed drones received by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2014- 2016, the report posits. The Chinese drones also compete against products emerging from US and Israeli industries.
Protecting its investments
As Beijing’s investments in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for
Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) did not prevent China in 2016 from forming a new group with Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to combat terrorism, dubbed the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM).
In September 2017, Tajikistan signed an agreement on establishing exchanges of
“China is also seen as dominating in areas where Russian technology continuesbto lag”
trade infrastructure, trade and invest- ment continue to grow, it has been seen as inevitable that China will eventually engage in protecting its investments.
Clear signs of the policy are visible in Beijing’s increased military cooperation with Tajikistan. The two countries
held counter-terrorism exercises on
the Tajik-Afghan border in 2016 and the giant eastern neighbour offered to build several military outposts and facilities. The existence of the
security intelligence between China and Tajikistan during a state visit by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to China. The agreement is meant to help the
two sides combat the threats of terror- ism, separatism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and international crime groups by launching professional intel- ligence exchanges.
Independent think tank International Crisis Group said in 2018 that China has deployed troops in Tajikistan close to
 A frontier defence regiment of the Chinese PLA Army and a Tajikistani border defence unit carrying out a joint patrol.
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