Page 91 - Ray Dalio - Principles
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limits  and  that  the  quality  of  my  work,  and  my  work-life
                       balance, are both suffering unacceptably.”




                          THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC

                                             CRISIS OF 2008



                       Recognizing that I was stretched wouldn’t by itself be enough

                       to  slow  the  flow  of  things  coming  at  me,  especially  in  the
                       investment  area  at  what  proved  to  be  a  time  of  historic
                       turbulence.

                          Because  too  often  I  had  been  painfully  surprised  by
                       different types of events that hadn’t happened to me before but
                       happened  in  other  times  or  other  places—like  the  currency
                       devaluation of 1971, or the debt crisis in the early 1980s—I’d

                       developed our economic and market principles to be timeless
                       and  universal.  In  other  words,  I  knew  that  we  needed  to
                       understand  all  important  economic  and  market  movements,
                       not  just  those  that  happened  to  me,  and  to  make  sure  the
                       principles  we  were  using  to  position  ourselves  would  have
                       worked in all past times and all other countries.

                          As  a  result,  back  in  the  early  2000s,  we  had  included  a

                       “depression  gauge”  in  our  systems  that  specified  the  actions
                       we  should take if a certain configuration of  events began to
                       play out in a way indicating a heightened risk of a debt crisis
                       and depression. In 2007, this gauge indicated that a bubble of
                       debt was nearing its bursting point because the costs of debt
                       service were outpacing projected cash flows. Because interest
                       rates  were  so  close  to  0  percent,  I  knew  that  central  banks

                       could  not  ease  monetary  policy  enough  to  reverse  the
                       downturn the way they had in prior recessions. This was the
                       exact configuration that had led to past depressions.

                          My mind and gut flashed back to my 1979–82 experience. I
                       was now both thirty years more knowledgeable and a whole
                       lot less confident. While the dynamic in the economy seemed
                       clear to me, I was much less sure I was right. I remembered

                       how clearly it had seemed to me that the debt bust I’d been
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