Page 93 - Ray Dalio - Principles
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scary to all of us because of what it might mean to those who
                       weren’t protected.

                          As  in  1982,  when  conditions  deteriorated  and
                       circumstances  increasingly  transpired  as  we’d  predicted,

                       policymakers began to pay more attention to us. Betfarhad had
                       me come to the White House to meet with him. Tim Geithner,
                       president  of  the  New  York  Fed,  asked  to  see  me  as  well.  I
                       brought Bob, Greg, and a young analyst named Bob Elliott to
                       a  lunch  meeting  with  Geithner.  We  walked  him  through  the
                       numbers  and  he  literally  turned  white.  When  he  asked  me

                       where we’d gotten them from, I told him they were publicly
                       available. We’d just put them together and looked at them in a
                       different way.

                          Two  days  after  our  meeting  with  Geithner,  Bear  Stearns
                       collapsed. That didn’t trigger much worry for most people or
                       for the markets, though it was a sign of what was to come. It
                       wasn’t  until  six  months  later  in  September,  when  Lehman

                       Brothers collapsed, that everyone else connected the dots. At
                       that  point  the  dominoes  fell  fast,  and  though  they  couldn’t
                       contain  all  the  damage,  policymakers,  most  importantly  Fed
                       chairman  Ben  Bernanke,  reacted  brilliantly  to  create  “a
                       beautiful deleveraging” (i.e., a way of lowering debt burdens
                       while keeping economic growth positive and inflation low).             8


                          To make this long story short, we navigated this period well
                       for our clients, anticipating market moves and avoiding losses.
                       Our flagship fund made over 14 percent in 2008, a year when
                       many other investors recorded losses of more than 30 percent.
                       We  would  have  done  even  better  had  we  not  feared  being
                       wrong, which led us to balance our bets instead of arrogantly
                       and foolishly putting more chips at stake. But I had no regrets
                       because  I  had  learned  that  it  wasn’t  smart  to  bet  that  way.

                       While  in  this  case  we  would  have  made  more  money  if  we
                       were less balanced, we certainly wouldn’t have survived and
                       succeeded  long  enough  to  be  in  such  a  position  if  we’d
                       approached our investments in that way.

                          The 2008 debt crisis was another one of those like the one
                       in  1982,  which  were  both  like  many  more  before  them  and

                       many more that will come. I  enjoyed reflecting back on my
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