Page 40 - Ruminations
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38. Existentialism: the enemies within

         Existentialism  had  a  strong  following  among  college  students,
       political activists and religious rebels in  the  middle  of the  twentieth
       century.  It  provided  a  good  grounding  for  accepting  ontological
       monism and personal responsibility, achieved in practice by rigorous
       self-analysis  to  eliminate  falsehood  and  delusion.  Yet  it  is  gone,
       sinking into history with a large crop of “-isms.” Why?
         Owing  to  their  entanglement  with  physics,  psychology  and
       theology, all philosophies, ancient to modern, fail. Without a complete
       divorce  from  those  other  three  fields  of  thought,  existentialism
       ultimately fared no better than its predecessors. A cautionary tale may
       thus be told about strange intellectual bedfellows.
         First, the emotional reaction to this deicidal rejection of dualism,
       driven by advances in empiricism and the proof that reality is a four-
       dimensional  continuum,  is  by  many  people  to  reserve  a  kernel  of
       denial  as  buffer  against  the  dread  arising  from  existential
       meaninglessness. It is not easy to retain belief in one’s essence as mere
       inauthentic reification of arbitrary and contingent values.
         And that unease blends with psychological abandonment, a fear of
       lost protective authority. Unavoidable relativism places the burden of
       perceived  choice  and  subjective  justification  back  on  the  individual,
       potentially a scary and unending trip through a hall of mirrors into the
       unconscious. And that comes with accepting logic as a useless tool in
       creating meaning within one’s life.
         Finally,  the  origin  of  existentialism  in  the  rejection  of  belief  by
       formerly religious thinkers is a clue to its character as an austere and
       absolute  substitute  for  a  theology  of  complete  enchantment  and
       commitment to unquestioned systems of belief. In the end, fidelity to
       existentialism’s  strictures  resembled  monkish  discipline  and  self-
       mortification—unnecessarily, as G. K. Chesterton pointed out.
         As  a  replacement  for  ideology, existentialism  asked  too  much  of
       human  beings  barely  beginning  to  emerge  from  superstition.  It  was
       particularly unfit for political struggles requiring faith in a cause (other
       than anarchism), a hallmark of its heyday. More tragically, it may have
       contributed to a rejection or misunderstanding of the implications of
       some  real  advances  in  scientific  knowledge—once  called  natural
       philosophy.
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