Page 7 - Boundedness Revisited
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A. Boundedness and logical empiricism
Ontological and epistemological issues remain unresolved
because of the two unrelated types of “things” and “means of
knowing them” in logical-empirical theory. The principle of
boundedness, when applied to analytic and synthetic symbols and
propositions, first reduces the two types to one, then eliminates
the issues altogether. The result follows from a boundary analysis
of empiricism and logic.
The arbitrariness of distinguishing perceptions has been
understood in many eras and cultures, including our own. If I see
green and you see yellow, or I measure 1.000000 cm. and you
measure 1.000001 cm., or I hear a train and you hear music, there
is no way to verify which of us is correct. The content or qualities
of any perception are functions of the distinctions made by
perceivers; realization of this fact led empiricism into a
compromise meaningful in terms of boundary analysis. The strict
criterion of experience as the means for verifying synthetic
statements gave way to “verification in principle”: although no one
has reported seeing a unicorn, if there were one it would be visible
and thus verifiable. This principle reduces to the principle of
boundedness: that which is perceived is bounded. Perception or
experience is the distinction of an inside by a perceivable
difference; that difference, however, is based upon a boundary
which is arbitrary and fictional regardless of the sentiments of the
distinction-maker. A synthetic symbol thus represents an inside,
subject to the criteria for valid boundedness, without respect to its
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unverifiable content.
The referents of analytic symbols are generally ignored by
logicians because logic works without reference to any specific
qualities. The relations of equivalence (tautology and
particles” and “consciousness” among them. In these matters my opinions have
not changed over the years. See also section II.C and the addendum.
12 By convention, empirical verifiability is established within a given percentage
of probability—always less than one hundred percent. My use of “unverifiable”
here may be misleading: I meant absolutely verifiable.
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