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with voting behavior. Because gerrymandering is designed to increase the number of
“wasted votes” among the electorate, as the majority interest packs its opponents’ voters
into designated districts, the relative representation of particular groups, whether
ideological, ethnic, or economic, can diverge from their actual share of the voting
population.
Gerrymandering has become a central feature of the American political system, as state
legislators fulfill their constitutional obligation to accommodate changes in the population
by adjusting state and federal legislative districts after each decennial census. In the
process, both major parties utilize their positions in the state legislatures and
gubernatorial mansions to carve out personal and partisan advantage. Even in states
where bipartisan commissions have been established to draw districts, they sometimes
break down amid partisan standoffs, prompting the courts to step in and replace district
maps that would have egregiously violated equal protection clauses of the Constitution
and federal legislation.

The self-interested nature of this process, as it occurs in 49 states, is prima facie corrupt.
That alternatives are possible is made clear by the practice in the state of Iowa, where
redistricting is entrusted to the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau with specific
instructions not to consider the location of incumbents or party interest. Indeed, in 2002,
two of Iowa’s incumbent House members—Jim Leach (R) and Leonard Boswell (D)—had to
move their place of residence in order to run in newly configured districts.4 Those looking
for proof that gerrymandering achieves its aims typically point to the longevity in office of
its practitioners and beneficiaries. Since the 1950s, elections to the U.S. House of
Representatives in particular have been marked by an increasingly conspicuous lack of
competitiveness. In 2002, only four incumbents in the 435-seat House lost to
nonincumbent challengers (though others retired, and four were defeated by rival
incumbents in newly reconfigured districts)—the fewest ever in the country’s history. In
2004, only five of the 404 incumbents seeking reelection were defeated at the polls, a
reelection rate of 99 percent.5
Nevertheless, American scholars are divided on the impact of redistricting and
gerrymandering on incumbency, with some asserting that there is, in fact, little hard
evidence that it works as well as popularly believed.6 A major reason for the lack of
consensus is the difficultly of separating the effect of redistricting from other incumbency
advantages, discussed below, as well as from social and political trends at the national,
regional, and local levels. Complicating the issue further—and apparently leading many
scholars to support the null hypothesis when, in fact, a small but real effect may exist—is
the observation that the effects of redistricting can vary widely depending on the type of
gerrymander employed.
An incumbent-protecting gerrymander creates safer seats for current members on both
sides of the aisle, so it decreases the number of competitive, marginal districts contested
by incumbents in the election cycle immediately following redistricting. In partisan
gerrymandering, however, the party in power will often attempt to concentrate opposition
supporters into as few districts as possible (and sometimes dilute its own advantage in
secure areas) in order to increase its overall majority. Depending on how far this process is
taken, it can have the effect of increasing the number of marginal seats. Moreover,
redistricting plans are frequently hybrids combining some aspects of each kind of
gerrymander. Many argue that, in the aggregate, the decrease in electoral competition

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