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created by incumbency-protection gerrymandering is balanced by the increase in
competition resulting from partisan gerrymandering.7
Calculating incumbency advantage. Before addressing the other tools available to
incumbents, it is worthwhile to note the difficulty of producing a precise calculation of their
overall electoral edge. As noted above, recent House reelection figures are fairly
impressive. Over the last five election cycles, incumbents have been returned to office an
average of 97 percent of the time. Even in the Democrats’ sweeping victory of 2006,
House members running for reelection managed to win 94.5 percent of their races.
Similarly, an examination of the proportion of congressional elections over the last 50
years that have been decided by less than 20 percentage points provides a panoramic
view of the rising level of stagnation in congressional elections. From 1960 to 1968,
House incumbents won by at least a 20-point margin, 64 percent of the time.8 Then,
during the 1970s, they won by that margin 73 percent of the time. From 1980 to 1988
the trend continued, with incumbents winning handily in 79 percent of all districts in which
they ran for reelection. Between 1990 and 1998, the tide temporarily reversed, as only 71
percent of incumbents won reelection by more than 20 percent.9 But the elections since
the turn of the millennium have been the most stagnant of any decade since
Reconstruction. Over the last four election cycles, 83 percent of House incumbents won by
more than 20 points. Again, in the tumultuous 2006 elections, 79 percent of those
seeking reelection were returned via landslide margins of 20 points or more.
Nonetheless, incumbency reelection rates are an incomplete measure of incumbency
advantage. They assume that incumbents and challengers are essentially equal, as if
selected at random, when they are not. Incumbents have already won an election and are
thus, ipso facto, better-than-average campaigners. Furthermore, challengers who choose—
or are chosen—to run in districts that are deemed safe for the incumbent party or
lawmaker are typically not as competitive as the average candidate. And incumbents who
perceive that they are unlikely to be reelected, due to personal problems or broader
political trends, often retire strategically. Thus a discussion focused mainly on reelection
rates tends to overstate the incumbent’s entrenchment.
Among the first scholars to address this problem and present a more nuanced estimate of
incumbency advantage was Robert Erikson, who in 1971 measured its magnitude as the
difference between a candidate’s success in an initial electoral win and that of subsequent
victories. His measure also controls for redistricting, partisan electoral tides, and the effect
of running against an incumbent—for members who did not enter Congress through an
open seat. Erikson found that, on average, incumbency in the 1960s was worth about two
percentage points on election day.10 Recent studies, using essentially the same
methodology, have shown that incumbency advantage has grown drastically since 1960
and place its current value at between 8 and 11 percentage points.11
Professionalization and earmarking. Some analysts attribute the longevity of lawmakers in
office to the growing professionalization of the nation’s legislatures during the 20th
century.12 On the one hand, professionalization increases legislative effectiveness, leads
to higher productivity, expands membership diversity, and brings in savvier, more adept
representatives.13 On the other hand, over the last 60 years, career-minded legislators
have developed tools and provided themselves with resources that both raise the barrier
for entry and serve them well in reelection bids.
A popular perception of congressional dynamics juxtaposes the major political parties in
fierce battle with one another, locked in a zero-sum game with the majority attempting to

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