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Media in Retreat  93



              representation or switch to a district system in which voters would choose not from a
              slate of political parties but from among individual candidates.
                   The media, by following these three battles, bolstered opposition efforts to ensure
              a fairer process. Since civil servants overwhelmingly belonged to Golkar—a legacy
              of mandatory membership under Suharto—barring them from campaigning would
              limit the ruling party’s unfair access to state resources. Similarly, reducing the num-
              ber of military appointees, whose interests and votes coincided with Golkar’s, would
              curb the party’s advantages in the legislature. Finally, concern for fairness emerged
              in debates over whether to use a district or proportional system of representation.
              Under the latter, voters choose from a list of parties rather than candidates, and
              parties receive seats proportional to votes won at the provincial level. Party leaders
              then select individuals to fill the seats. A district system, advocates argued, would let
              voters choose among party candidates in the country’s more than three hundred dis-
              tricts and special municipalities, increasing the accountability of representatives to
              their constituents. But opponents worried that such a system might foster regional
              separatism, and incumbent legislators, who generally lacked connections to the areas
              they represented, feared competing against local personalities.
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                   For multiple reasons, the drafting committee voted overwhelmingly to retain the
              proportional representation that advantaged incumbents, particularly Golkar. But
              they could not agree on whether to count votes at the provincial level (Level I), allow-
              ing minority parties to preserve votes otherwise lost, or at the regency level (Level II),
              as Golkar representatives advocated. If votes were counted at Level II, a party could
              easily win a first-past-the-post victory in a regency or township without winning the
              majority of local votes. Anticipating the 1999 elections, an opposition party represen-
              tative estimated that Golkar could win more than half the vote using a Level II system,
              versus no more than 20 percent if votes were counted at Level I.
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                   Though these  battles would affect  how opposition parties would fare against
              Golkar’s nationwide machine, the arcane details received little media attention. Nev-
              ertheless, pressure from other parties forced compromises. The drafting committee
              agreed to use a Level I system, and Habibie decreed that civil servants must take leave
              to support a political party.
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                   These concessions suggest that this relatively democratic legislative process—
              allowing open debate and giving voting power to all parties—had worked, reducing the
              media burden of critical analysis. But journalists failed to scrutinize other aspects of the
              new rules that would impact both the parliamentary and presidential elections, includ-
              ing the disproportional allocation of seats favoring Golkar’s outer island strongholds.
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                   Nor was there significant coverage of biases favoring Golkar in appointing non-
              elective provincial representatives (Utusan Daerah) and sectoral group representa-
              tives (Utusan Golongan), although these two hundred appointive seats, plus the
              thirty-eight appointive military seats, would make  up a third of the new seven-
              hundred-member MPR that would select the president in October. These biases
              would sow bitter controversies later, but as the January 28 deadline for the bills’
              approval approached, the media’s dominant concern was whether they would be
              rejected and the elections canceled. This concern for the survival of the process
              over its integrity would emerge repeatedly in the months to come.
                   After the three  bills passed, numerous print outlets focused  briefly on Golkar
              engagement in “money politics” to influence members of the General Election Com-
              mission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU).    As June 7 approached,  however, such
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              concerns were sidelined by stories anticipating violence and fears that the elections
              might not go forward at all.    In the following weeks, continued emphasis on possible
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