Page 109 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

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violence prevented scrutiny of the systematic electoral manipulation that would posi-
tion Golkar to retain its control over government.

Covering the Count
On June 7, 1999, after much speculation that Indonesia’s first free elections in forty-

four years might collapse in violence, over 87 percent of the country’s 128 million eligi-
ble voters cast ballots. In this landmark contest, overseen by the new KPU, forty-eight
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parties competed for parliamentary seats. When voting ended without major incident
and early returns showed the popular opposition party PDIP in the lead, relief among
local and international observers was palpable. The former US president Jimmy Carter
called the elections a “festival of democracy” and declared the voting “fair and peaceful.”
Carter added a cautionary note, saying he had “never seen so complicated a process to
choose a president,” but the characterization “free and fair” circulated around the globe,
virtually closing the books on the story for the international press.
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Within Indonesia, however, euphoria soon faded, and the situation grew murky.
There was little question that voting had been peaceful and, according to initial reports,
conducted fairly in all but two provinces, Aceh and East Timor. PDIP’s early lead,
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unimaginable in past elections, encouraged optimism that Indonesia was launched
securely on a path to political change. But its strong showing distracted attention
from Golkar’s manipulation of the process which, though more sophisticated, was as
extensive—and successful—as in past elections.
The manipulation took place both through ordinary fraud and a strategy that one
could call “winning by losing.” Unlike the simple majority needed to win a direct election
for president, Indonesia’s indirect selection by parliamentary delegates provided multiple
points for maneuvering that eluded most observers. Instead of blatant cheating to steal the
elections, Golkar could adopt a more subtle strategy of limited fraud—in the voting and
the count—to give its parliamentary delegation a less conspicuous second place and then
build coalitions with smaller parties to elect its candidate from the floor of parliament.
Complaints over “ordinary fraud”—primarily poll violations—began coming in
as soon as the polls closed on June 7. Only three days later, the Independent Election
Monitoring Committee had already received reports of 19,504 violations from their
observations at 79,000 of the country’s 250,000 polling centers.
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Most violations involved Golkar, with the most serious in provinces where the
party had fared best, particularly on Sulawesi, the president’s home island. In South
Sulawesi, after Golkar took two-thirds of the vote, twenty-eight rival parties united
to demand a recount, accusing the ruling party of handing out cash bribes. In two
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regencies, thirty-five parties rejected the results wholesale, citing serious Golkar
infractions. By June 29, the Independent Election Monitoring Committee had con-
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firmed over 9,800 violations in this province alone.
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Controversy was greater in North Sulawesi, where Golkar won over half the vote. In
mid-June, one observer wrote, “the entire province . . . decided in a tense meeting . . . to
hold the entire election over again thanks to Golkar’s violations.” Significantly, among
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the forty-eight parties contesting these elections, Golkar won a landslide 57 percent,
gaining the party four of the province’s seven DPR seats. In Central Sulawesi, another
site of myriad violations, Golkar won a crushing 70 percent of the national vote and half
of the regional legislative seats.
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The Golkar machine was equally strong in the remote eastern islands. In East
Timor, where the party also took an early lead, election workers in three districts found