Page 115 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY
P. 115

100  Chapter 5



              Table 2  (continued)
                Province         Golkar     Golkar     PDIP     PDIP     Votes   Number   Registered
              (report time)     (% of   votes    (% of   votes   reported  of seats   voters/
                               votes for        votes for          (%)             seat
                                top 5            top 5
                               parties)         parties)
                N. Sulawesi        57   294,413   26     132,238   56       7     248,346
              (11:17 p.m.)
                S. Sulawesi        75   765,070   10     101,026   31      24     176,234
              (9:09 p.m.)
                S. E. Sulawesi     77   240,576   12      37,262   43       5     180,166
              (9:16 p.m.)
                N. Sumatra          2    49,696   50     1,018,586  43     24     242,969
              (11:06 p.m.)
                S. Sumatra         26   511,612   47     919,200   60      15     271,434
              (9:38 p.m.)
                W. Sumatra         28   278,081   13     126,732   53      14     168,886
              (11:22 p.m.)
                E. Timor (2:01 p.m.)     47  58,238  44   54,826   39       4     105,024
                * Includes overseas ballots.
                  Source:  Joint Operations Media Center, Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, 11:25 p.m., June 14, 1999.





              won up to two-thirds of the popular vote in past elections, such margins were no lon-
              ger credible. Given support for PDIP, even engineering a more modest win would have
              risked rejection from the opposition, delegitimating the entire election.    However, by
                                                                            69
              allowing PDIP a wide margin in the first volatile days after the voting and then closing
              this lead over time, Golkar avoided provoking a backlash against its eventual strong
              showing.
                      70
                   Although observers paid little attention and opposition parties appeared unaware
              or complacent, Golkar remained confident, a position that, in retrospect, was a har-
              binger of a predetermined outcome. Three weeks in, the party chair, Akbar Tanjung,
              boasted that Golkar would narrow the gap with the front-running PDIP to just thirty-
              five seats, allowing it to form a coalition government.
                                                             71
                   Tanjung’s prediction was eerily precise. In the near-final results released in mid-
              July, Golkar had closed the gap with PDIP to thirty-four seats. Significantly, Golkar’s
              strongest showing was in the eastern islands, where the party won an average of
              36 percent of provincial seats compared to only 17 percent on Java and Bali.    Tan-
                                                                                   72
              jung also predicted that PDIP would have trouble convincing Muslim parties to sup-
              port a woman, Megawati, for the presidency, allowing Golkar to build coalitions with
              the three largest Islamic parties and gain another 105 seats.    He further speculated
                                                                    73
              that by asking General Wiranto to be Habibie’s running mate when the presidential
              slates came before parliament, Golkar could ensure the votes of the MPR’s thirty-eight
              armed forces delegates in the final ballot.
                                                  74
   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119   120